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Decisions made by the government-linked companies (GLCs) and family-owned 
businesses (FOBs) are seen to be fundamentally different. This issue has 
become more pertinent now that ownership and control structures of major oil 
palm corporations have become far more complex in the context of growing and 
intense competition. This study analysed whether the control and decision-
making is determined by the type of owner, i.e. the government or a family. 
 
 
In the palm oil, forestry and biomass sectors, where GLCs and family-owned 
companies are present as big businesses, there is a major gap in understanding 
what drives their decision-making. Agribusiness corporations deal with 
challenging decisions that have economic, social and environmental 
implications, regardless of their ownership. The global agriculture sector is under 
the process of more financialisation, precisely through the extension of major 
agribusiness corporations. Understanding what really drives their decision 
making, be it their control patterns or other factors is of extreme importance for 
the sustainability of agricultural sectors worldwide. 
 
 
The study was designed to analyse how the ownership structure inform decision-
making behaviour by the of oil palm corporations owned by the government and 
family. This is a pioneering study that seeks to quantify and to assess the 
ownership and control patterns of two very different types of plantation 
companies. GLCs (Sime Darby, Boustead, IJM Plantations, and Kulim) and 
FoBs (IOI Corp, KLK, Genting Plantations, and Jaya Tiasa) are compared for 
their similarities and differences, and finally, analysed their decision-making 
behaviour.   
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A network analysis was employed in quantifying and analysing the corporate 
structures of eight major Malaysian oil palm corporations. The data were 
obtained from various reputable sources. There are 4,331 companies’ 
shareholding data gathered, covering ten levels of shareholding.  
 
 
The shareholdings data generated network topology graphs with its network 
centrality metrics. It explained the characteristic (pyramid levels, average 
ownership tier, subsidiaries degree, shareholding degree, hierarchy index 
structural control (betweenness) and decisions load (stress)) of the eight 
corporate networks structure. Based on the metrics, the research decipher their 
decision-making control behaviour.  
 
 
T-test was done to respond to whether GLCs and FOBs are similar or different.  
Linear regression was run to obtain further insights on the companies’ decision-
making behaviour pattern. The model was validated to further understand the 
decision-making behaviour. 
 
 
Based on the network centrality metrics comparison, the eight companies 
displayed variations in their designs of ownership structure. Not all GLCs 
structural control is significantly different from FOBs. The structural control did 
not appear to have any association with the ownership identity. There is a high 
similarity pattern of decisions load amongst the eight companies. Within FOBs, 
the decisions load for all four companies are similar. 
 
 
Linear regression models showed a linear pattern of increasing decisions load 
as the structural control increases. Global model presented a better fitted model 
to understand their decision-making behaviour.  
 
 
The global model explained that the eight companies were scattered and not 
inclined to their ownership identity. Three groups had appeared: Boustead was 
in Group 1; Sime Darby, KLK, IOI Corp, IJM Plantations and Genting Plantations 
were in Group 2; and Jaya Tiasa and Kulim were in Group 3. The groupings 
signify their similarity in decision-making behaviour pattern. However, each 
companies were different in terms of the decisions load given the same 
subsidiaries’ structural control and vice versa. Even though the companies 
belonged to the same group, followed the same linear pattern of increasing 
decisions load when structural control increased, their decisions load are all 
different given the same structural control. There was an emerging behaviour 
derived from the intercepts of the decisions load and structural control 
relationship. This research regards the behaviour as structural flexibility. The 
structural flexibility of the companies was highly dependent on the number of 
subsidiaries, hierarchy index and pyramid size.  
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Based on the results, the analysis showed that each company, whether a GLC 
or a family-owned enterprise, functioned differently. Their decision-making 
behaviour depended less on ownership type and more on the topology or design 
of the structure, such as the number of the companies, hierarchy index, and the 
pyramid size. The different levels of decisions load and control denote a variety 
of flexibility patterns. 
 
 
The analyses proved that the ownership structure of a company influenced their 
decision-making behaviour. This research concluded that their decision-making 
control behaviour depended less on ownership type and more on the topology 
or design of the ownership structure. Both of the GLCs and FOBs have 
similarities and differences in their decision-making behaviour. The results may 
contradict with some other studies and it opens a new field of research and 
analysis of corporations, regardless of their ownership type/identity 
(government-owned or family-owned). This method allows us to evaluate the 
ownership topology structure quantitatively and qualitatively. Furthermore, these 
companies can be ranked based on the analysis used in this research. 
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Keputusan yang dibuat oleh syarikat berkaitan Kerajaan (GLC) dan perniagaan 
milik keluarga (FOB) dilihat berbeza. Isu ini menjadi lebih penting apabila struktur 
pemilikan dan kawalan syarikat minyak kelapa sawit utama menjadi jauh lebih 
kompleks dalam konteks persaingan yang semakin meningkat dan sengit. Kajian 
ini menganalisis sama ada kawalan dalam membuat keputusan ditentukan oleh 
jenis pemilik, iaitu kerajaan atau keluarga, atau struktur pemilikan syarikat. 
 
 
Di sektor minyak kelapa sawit, perhutanan dan biomas, di mana syarikat-
syarikat GLC dan syarikat milik keluarga hadir sebagai perniagaan besar. 
Terdapat jurang utama dalam memahami apa yang mendorong proses 
membuat keputusan mereka. Perusahaan perniagaantani menghadapi cabaran 
yang mencabar apabila pembuatan keputusan mereka merangkumi implikasi 
ekonomi, sosial, dan alam sekitar, tanpa mengira pemilikan mereka. Sektor 
pertanian global berada di bawah proses ‘financialisation’, melalui syarikat-
syarikat perniagaantani utama. Memahami apa yang benar-benar mendorong 
keputusan mereka, sama ada corak kawalan mereka atau faktor-faktor lain, 
adalah sangat penting bagi kemapanan sektor pertanian di seluruh dunia. 
 
 
Kajian ini dirancang untuk menganalisis bagaimana struktur pemilikan 
memaklumkan tingkah laku pengambilan keputusan oleh syarikat-syarikat 
kelapa sawit yang dimiliki oleh kerajaan dan keluarga. Ini adalah kajian perintis 
yang bertujuan untuk mengkuantifikasi dan menilai pola pemilikan dan kawalan 
dua jenis syarikat perladangan yang sangat berbeza. Kajian ini terdiri daripada 
dua kumpulan pemilikan syarikat, GLC (Sime Darby, Boustead, IJM Plantations, 
dan Kulim) dan FoB (IOI Corp, KLK, Genting Plantations, dan Jaya Tiasa). 
Syarikat di dalam setiap kumpulan dibandingkan, untuk menilai persamaan dan 
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perbezaan mereka, dan menganalisis kelakuan mereka yang membuat 
keputusan. 
Analisis rangkaian digunakan dalam mengkuantifikasi dan menganalisis struktur 
korporat lapan syarikat utama kelapa sawit Malaysia. Data diperoleh dari 
pelbagai sumber yang bereputasi. Terdapat 4,331 data pegangan saham 
syarikat yang dikumpulkan, meliputi sepuluh peringkat pegangan saham. 
 
 
Data pemegangan saham menghasilkan graf topologi rangkaian dengan metrik 
sentraliti. Metrik rangkaian menjelaskan sifat (tahap piramid, peringkat pemilikan 
purata, darjah anak syarikat, darjah kepemilikan saham, indeks hierarki, kawalan 
struktur (Betweenness) dan beban keputusan (Stress) ) dari lapan rangkaian 
struktur korporat. Berdasarkan metrik rangkaian ini, tingkah laku membuat 
keputusan dinilai. 
 
 
Ujian-T(T-test) telah dilakukan untuk memberi respons kepada sama ada GLC 
dan FOB adalah sama atau berbeza. Regresi linear dijalankan dengan 
menggunakan model regresi untuk mendapatkan gambaran lanjut tentang corak 
tingkah laku pengambilan keputusan syarikat. Model ini telah disahkan untuk 
terus memahami tingkah laku keputusan. 
 
 
Berdasarkan perbandingan metrik pusat yang sederhana, lapan syarikat 
mempamerkan pelbagai reka bentuk struktur pemilikan. Perbandingan metrik 
rangkaian lanjutan telah dilakukan menggunakan ujian T. Keputusan 
menunjukkan bahawa kawalan struktur untuk semua syarikat mempunyai 
persamaan dan perbezaan. Tidak semua kawalan struktur GLC berbeza dengan 
FOB. Kawalan struktur tidak kelihatan bersekutu dengan identiti pemilikan. 
Terdapat corak persamaan tinggi keputusan yang diambil di kalangan lapan 
syarikat. Di dalam FOB, keputusan yang diambil untuk semua empat syarikat 
adalah serupa. 
 
 
Dalam analisis selanjutnya, kajian ini menjalankan model regresi linear. Model 
ini menunjukkan corak linear meningkatkan keputusan beban apabila kawalan 
struktur meningkat. Model global membentangkan model yang lebih baik untuk 
memahami tingkah laku mereka dalam membuat keputusan. 
 
 
Model global menjelaskan bahawa lapan syarikat berserakan dan tidak 
cenderung kepada identiti pemilikan mereka. Tiga kumpulan yang muncul, 
Boustead berada dalam Kumpulan 1, Sime Darby, KLK, IOI Corp, IJM 
Plantations, dan Genting Plantations berada dalam Kumpulan 2, dan Jaya Tiasa 
dan Kulim berada dalam Kumpulan 3. Pengumpulan menunjukkan kesamaan 
mereka dalam corak tingkah laku membuat keputusan . Walau bagaimanapun, 
setiap syarikat berbeza dari segi beban keputusan yang diberikan kawalan 
struktur anak syarikat yang sama dan sebaliknya. Walaupun syarikat itu 
tergolong dalam kumpulan yang sama, mengikuti corak linear yang sama yang 
semakin meningkat keputusan apabila kawalan struktur meningkat, beban 
keputusan mereka semua berbeza dengan kawalan struktur yang sama. 
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Terdapat tingkah laku yang muncul dari pemintas beban keputusan dan 
hubungan kawalan struktur. Kajian ini menganggap kelakuan sebagai fleksibiliti 
struktur. Kelenturan struktur syarikat sangat bergantung kepada bilangan 
syarikat, indeks hierarki, dan saiz piramid. 
 
 
Berdasarkan hasilnya, analisis menunjukkan bahawa setiap syarikat, sama ada 
GLC atau perusahaan milik keluarga, berfungsi secara berbeza. Tingkah laku 
pengambilan keputusan mereka kurang bergantung pada jenis pemilikan dan 
lebih banyak pada topologi atau reka bentuk struktur, seperti bilangan syarikat, 
indeks hierarki, dan saiz piramid. Tahap keputusan dan kawalan yang berbeza 
menunjukkan pelbagai corak fleksibiliti. 
 
 
Analisisnya membuktikan bahawa struktur pemilikan syarikat mempengaruhi 
tingkah laku mereka membuat keputusan. Kajian ini menyimpulkan bahawa 
tingkah laku mereka membuat keputusan kurang bergantung pada jenis 
pemilikan dan lebih banyak pada topologi atau reka bentuk struktur pemilikan. 
Kedua-dua GLC dan FOB mempunyai persamaan dan perbezaan dalam tingkah 
laku mereka membuat keputusan. Hasilnya mungkin bertentangan dengan 
beberapa kajian lain dan ia membuka bidang penyelidikan dan analisis baru 
korporat, tanpa mengira jenis / identiti pemilikan mereka (milik kerajaan atau 
milik keluarga). Kaedah ini membolehkan kami menilai struktur topologi 
pemilikan secara kuantitatif dan kualitatif. Selain itu, syarikat-syarikat ini boleh 
dinilai berdasarkan analisis yang digunakan dalam kajian ini.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
 
What shapes a company’s decision-making? Does it depend on the owner’s 
identity or the company’s structure? Why is it important to understand the 
company’s decision-making behaviour? These are the questions that opened the 
path for this research. 
 
 
In the literature, the common idea is ownership and control depend on who the 
owner is. There are three main identities of an owner in a firm: government, 
family and private. It is believed that decision-making in government-owned 
companies is determined by political influence. Meanwhile, decisions in family-
owned companies rely heavily on aspirations of the founder, while those of 
private companies are controlled by professionals who make decisions based on 
facts and figures. 
 
 
However, while the owner may influence decision-making control of a firm, the 
ownership structure may have equal or even more influence. The ownership 
structure of a business involves a multitude of shareholding relations among 
stakeholders. The stakeholders vary from individuals, government and financial 
institutions. Among these stakeholders, one will have significant ownership of 
the business. As the structure of a company grows more complex, the power 
and control flow from the ultimate shareholder may be concealed and identifying 
the actual controller of decisions becomes more difficult. Cross-shareholdings 
and a pyramidal structure play important roles in transferring information when 
making decisions. An assessment of cross-shareholdings can reveal the amount 
of control held by a company/individual in a structure, where they own each other 
but have different amounts of control. For example, company A owns company 
B by 51%, while company B owns company A by 10%, but these interlocking 
shareholdings may hide the identity of the actual controller of decisions. The 
pyramidal structure reflects the hierarchical level of information flow in decision-
making. The more pyramidal the company, the bigger the flow of information, a 
factor that can result in inflexibility in the decision-making process.  
 
 
Given that the ownership structure of companies involved in diversified business 
activities vary, it is crucial to analyse them in a greater detail, to gain a better 
understanding of their decision-making behaviour. Generally, when the 
behaviour is better understood, the policy intervention is better designed. 
 
 
The agribusiness and plantations sector is the focus of this research. 
Agribusiness and plantations are the leading agents in Malaysia’s agriculture 
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industry. The oil palm industry constitutes most of the agribusiness and 
plantations sector and is the major contributor to the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the agriculture sector. In 2016, the oil palm industry contributed 43 
percent to the sector, compared to forestry logging and rubber that only 
contributed 7 percent respectively (Department of Statistics, 2017). 
 
 
Agribusiness and plantation companies face the dilemma of balancing financial 
growth and environmental sustainability. They need to achieve financial growth 
to satisfy shareholders’ return on investment, and at the same time, they have to 
manage trading and investment responsibly to sustain the environment for the 
future. For government-linked companies (GLCs), there is another dilemma 
which is to fulfil their social obligations. They have to adhere to the ruling 
government’s visions and aspirations which highly depend on the political 
agenda.  How well they carry out these responsibilities depends on their ability 
to make responsible decisions. For that reason, it is vital to understand the 
decision-making behaviour of companies in this sector.  
 
 
The global agriculture sector is in the process of financialisation, a process in 
which the role of financial institutions as shareholders is becoming more 
prevalent. The increasing amount of investment by leading agribusiness 
corporations is one of the drivers of this process (Anseeuw, Jean-Marc, Antoine, 
& Norfaryanti, 2016).  Financialisation has increased the complexity of the 
ownership structure of these firms, including those owned by the government, 
families or private individuals. These companies, regardless of who the owners 
are, possibly have more complex structures, i.e. interlocking shareholdings and 
pyramiding. The core questions of this study are: how do complex shareholding 
structures shape decision-making among government- and family-owned 
companies in this sector? Is it true, as the current literature suggests, that their 
decision-making mechanisms are still controlled by their ultimate owners? Are 
there significant differences in the decision-making processes of government- 
and family-owned companies? 
 
 
1.2 The Research Gap 
 
 
The relationship between companies’ ownership structure and decision-making 
behaviour among agribusiness corporations has not yet been clarified. The use 
of network analysis to explore this relationship is also lacking. Therefore, this 
research fills the gap by analysing quantitatively and qualitatively the oil palm 
plantation corporations’ ownership structure to explore its relationship with 
decision-making behaviour.  
 
 
The ownership structure of a company has a crucial bearing on its corporate 
strategies (Chandler, 1962; Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 1978). The 
ownership structures of large corporations are complex and diverse which 
informs their decision-making behaviour. Decision-making control by a corporate 
entity is complex because of the convoluted shareholding structures within the 
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company. The ownership structures that can be employed include cross-
shareholdings and pyramidal structures that can contribute to the complexity of 
the decision-making process. Such structures could also lead to devious 
decision-making. 
 
 
Government-linked companies (GLCs) and family-owned businesses (FOBs) 
are seen to be fundamentally different in terms of the nature of their ownership 
which, in turn, determines their decision-making control mechanisms. This issue 
has become more pertinent now that ownership structures of major corporations 
have become extremely complex in the context of growing corporation size and 
intense competition. In the palm oil, forestry and biomass sectors, both GLCs 
and FOBs are big businesses that have contributed significantly to the 
development of these sectors.  
 
 
Control of decision-making in the corporation is vital. It leads to many 
implications. Excellent control will allow the corporation to prosper; bad control 
will devalue the corporation. Excellent control includes good governance in the 
decision-making process where the decisions made are legitimate and with high 
integrity. Weak control in decision-making encompasses conflicts-of-interest, no 
integrity, and inappropriate corporate activities. 
 
 
The board of directors and the management team are key actors in the decision-
making structure. They belong to the hierarchical managerial decision-making 
structure, also regarded as the power structure (Martz & Semple, 1985). Each 
hierarchy level has a range of control in the decision-making, and it carries a 
decision’s load. For example, a business development department has its 
hierarchy levels which are responsible for making decisions on future investment 
of the company. These decisions have a load in the hierarchy. The decisions 
load in the hierarchy somewhat reflects the decision-making behaviour of the 
company. 
 
 
Connections in the structure convey the flow and the concentration of corporate 
control as well as the flow of information. High concentration of ownership of 
shares reflects high influence over decision-making. 
 
 
In the agribusiness and plantation sectors, the decisions of a company are often 
directly related to environmental sustainability. These important sectors also 
recorded high volumes of trade and investment in the country and the region. 
Most of the time, it is difficult to decipher a decision made by a company because 
many aspects could drive decision-making, from political intervention, oil prices 
and environmental issues, to international trade and global financial market 
trends. Understanding the reason for decision-making by a company, be it to 
reinforce control patterns or other factors, is crucial as this provides insights into 
issues such as the sustainability of the agricultural sector worldwide. This 
research is designed to understand and analyse the decision-making patterns 
by major agribusiness and plantation companies in Malaysia. 
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GLCs and FOBs are big businesses that have contributed significantly to the 
development of these sectors but are seen to be fundamentally different 
regarding how their ownership structure patterns determine decision-making 
control. As the structure of a company grows more complex, the power and 
control flows from the ultimate shareholder may be hidden and identifying the 
actual controller of the decisions becomes more difficult. 
 
 
1.2.1 Logical Framework 
 
 
As indicated in the logical framework of this research in Figure 1.1, every 
structure has properties and a purpose. Structural theories established in the 
field of science, especially in chemistry, where it was developed stress this point. 
In the disciplines of business and economics, Chandler (1962) has set the 
ground for this research. According to him, organisational structure determines 
corporate strategy. Decision-making is part of corporate strategies. The 
decision-making is shaped by interactions between actors in the organisation. 
GLCs and FOBs have diverse actors with various objectives. The interactions 
among the actors are derived from the design of the ownership and control of 
the company. The design or the composition of the ownership and control 
shapes the company structure, reciprocally.  
 
 
Most of the ownership structures of companies are becoming complex networks. 
With the advancement of network studies, network analysis is emerging as an 
important tool to understand the interactions between actors in complex 
networks. Complex networks are present in a wide range of systems in nature 
and society, such as in the Internet, movie actor collaborations, cellular networks, 
ecological networks, citation networks, linguistics networks, power and neural 
networks, financial networks and many others (Albert & Barabasi, 2002).  
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Figure 1.1: Logical framework of the research 
 
 
A company’s structure determines its corporate behaviour and it can emerge as 
a complex structure, leading to why network analysis serves as a tool to link 
corporate strategies, ownership and control. This logical framework is the basis 
for the theoretical framework which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
 
Due to the complex corporate structure which informs decision-making influence, 
this research is designed to quantify and analyse the decision-making behaviour 
of each firm based on its corporate structure using network analysis tools. As 
mentioned, network analysis is emerging as a tool to analyse a complex network 
such as the shareholding structures of large companies. A decade ago, the tools 
used to analyse a complex network were limited. Over time, these tools have 
evolved and network analysis is able to uncover complex cross-shareholdings 
and pyramidal structures in a quantitative manner. 
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1.3 Scope of the Research 
 
 
This research is part of a bigger project under the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Research Programme 6 (CRP6) 
focused on forests, trees and agroforestry. It is funded by a partnership with 
various international agroforestry institutions, such as the Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR), World Agroforestry Centre, International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture and others. One objective of CRP6 is to study the impact of 
trade and investment on forests and people, particularly the effects of 
financialisation on the agriculture sector.  
 
 
To understand the impact of forest-related trade and investment in Southeast 
Asia, this research decided to focus on agribusiness and oil palm plantation 
companies, where most of the trade and investment in forest-related activities 
were recorded. The leading agribusiness and oil palm plantation companies are 
part of the financialisation of the global agriculture sector. This research analysed 
eight companies among the top 12 companies listed in Table 1.1. These eight 
companies are global players in the industry. As of 2013, there were 44 
agribusiness and plantation corporations listed on the Bursa Kuala Lumpur 
(Table 1.1). Their market capitalisation was then RM172 billion, 10% of the total 
market capital value of the Bursa Kuala Lumpur which was RM1.7 trillion 
(Gomez, Padmanabhan, Kamaruddin, Bhalla, & Fisal, 2017).  
 
 
Table 1.1: Agribusiness and plantation corporations listed in Bursa Kuala 
Lumpur in 2013 
No. Plantation corporations Market 
capital 
(RM 
billion) 
Ownership 
type 
Estimate
d 
planted 
area (ha) 
1. Sime Darby Berhad 57.5 Federal GLC 525,000 
2. IOI Corporation 30.0 Family 175,000 
3. Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad 
(KLK) 
23.5  Family 193,000 
4. Batu Kawan Berhad 8.518 Family 
5. Genting Plantations 7.759  Family 117,000 
6. United Plantations 5.707  Family 50,000 
7. Kulim (M) Berhad 4.259  State GLC 50,000 
8. TSH Resources 2.919  Family 50,000 
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9. IJM Plantations Berhad 2.882  Federal GLC 55,389 
10. Sarawak Oil Palms Berhad 2.628  Family 63,530 
11. Boustead Holdings Berhad 
(Boustead) 
2.544  Federal GLC 70,338 
12. Jaya Tiasa Holdings 2.064  Family 62,745 
13. Hap Seng Plantations 
Holdings 
2.024  Private 35,697 
14. TH Plantations 1.644  Federal GLC 60,270 
15. MKH Plantations 1.497  Private 14,400 
16. Ta Ann Holdings Berhad 1.464  Private 36,944 
17. United Malacca Berhad 1.456  Family 22,336 
18. TDM Berhad 1.415  State GLC 44,000 
19. Far East Holdings Berhad  1.067  State GLC 20,768 
20. Kretam Holdings 0.95  Private 19,842 
21. Rimbunan Sawit Berhad 0.94  Family 54,659 
22. Chin Tek Plantations Bhd  0.88 Family 10,925 
23. Kim Loong Resources Bhd 0.84 Family 23,512 
24. Tanah Makmur Berhad 0.79 Private 17,969 
25. BLD Plantation  0.78 Private 27,300 
26. Sarawak Plantation Berhad 0.70 Private 31,266 
27. Kwantas Corporation Bhd 0.66 Family 17,051 
28. WTK Holdings Berhad 0.61 Private 9,000 
29. Dutaland Berhad  0.51 Family 10,557 
30. PLS Plantation 0.47 Private 12,140 
31. Negri Sembilan Oil Palms Bhd 0.40 Family 2,653 
32. Inch Kenneth Kajang Rubber 
PLC 
0.36 Private 189 
33. NPC Resources Bhd 0.33 Private 17,316 
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34. Cepatwawasan Group Berhad  0.31 Family 11,331 
35. Golden Land Berhad 0.28 Family 9,414 
36. Riverview Rubber Estates 
Bhd 
0.28 Private 2,583 
37. Sungei Bagan Rubber Co (M) 
Bhd 
0.24 Family 2,615 
38. Kluang Rubber Co (M) Bhd 0.23 Family 1,574 
39. Harn Len Corporation Bhd 0.21 Family 12,751 
40. MHC Plantations Berhad 0.21 Family na 
41. Gopeng Berhad 0.15 Private 1,434 
42. Astral Asia Berhad  0.14 Private 4,019 
43. Malpac Holdings Bhd 0.14 Private 2,023 
44. Pinehill Pacific Berhad 0.06 Private 11,658 
 Total 172.325   
Sources: 2013 Companies’ Annual Report, 2013 Stock Performance Guide, and  
www.malaysiastock.biz  
 
 
Most of the big corporations were founded during the British colonial era. They 
started as rubber plantation companies and evolved into palm oil businesses 
between the 1960s and 1970s. As modernisation of the agriculture sector 
occurred, many of these corporations became involved in a diverse range of 
business activities, including property development, product manufacturing, 
heavy machinery and motor production. 
 
 
Based on Table 1.1, most of the public-listed companies (21 companies) in the 
plantation sector are family-owned. In the top ten, seven are family-owned 
businesses. In 2013, total market capital value for family-owned business in the 
plantation sector was RM90 billion, constituting 52% of the total plantation sector. 
The rests are either private companies (15) or GLCs (8). 
 
 
Among GLCs, there are four federal GLCs and three state GLCs. Entities under 
the federal government which owned plantation companies are Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), and 
Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH). State government entities which owned plantation 
companies are Johor Corporation, Terengganu Incorporated Sdn Bhd, and 
Lembaga Kemajuan Perusahaan Pertanian Negeri Pahang. The total market 
capital of GLCs in 2013 was RM71 billion, 41% of the total plantation sector. The 
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private companies are owned by private limited companies or individuals, which 
are neither government- nor family-owned. 
 
 
Out of 44 companies, this research analysed eight companies in the top 12, of 
which four are GLCs and four are FOBs. The GLCs are Sime Darby Berhad, 
Boustead Holdings Berhad, IJM Plantations and Kulim Berhad. The FOBs are 
IOI Corporations Berhad, Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad, Genting Plantations 
Berhad and Jaya Tiasa Berhad. They are major agribusiness and plantation 
players in Southeast Asia and the world, contributing about 50% of the total 
plantations market capital and land bank area.  
 
 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
 
 
Based on the problem highlighted earlier, several questions are raised to 
achieve the overall objective of the research. The research questions are: 
 
i. How to best describe the ownership structure of the corporations and 
link to decision-control behaviour? 
ii. Are the GLCs and FOBs ownership structures similar or different? 
iii. Is there a general criteria to link to the decision-control behaviour? 
iv. Can decision-control behaviour be represented by a mathematical 
relationship? 
 
 
1.3.2 Hypotheses 
 
 
This research is to test these hypotheses: 
 
1. Ownership structures of government-owned and family-owned 
companies in agribusiness and plantations are different. 
2. The differences or similarities in the ownership structure affect decision-
control, involving enterprise development. 
 
 
1.3.3 Objectives of the Research 
 
 
The overall objective of this study is to analyse the links between the ownership 
structure and the corporate decision-making control behaviour. The specific 
objectives are to: 
 
i) understand and analyse how the shareholding structure shapes 
decision-control behaviour of agribusiness corporations owned by 
the government and families; 
ii) understand and analyse decision-control patterns by GLCs and 
FOBs; and 
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iii) investigate if there is ownership structure criteria to explain decision-
control behaviour (model). 
 
 
1.3.4 Using the Emerging Network Analysis Tool 
 
 
Due to the complex corporate structure which informs decision-making, this 
research is designed to quantify and analyse the decision-making behaviour of 
each firm based on its corporate structure using network analysis tools. 
 
 
Network analysis is emerging as a tool to analyse complex networks such as the 
ecological network, financial network, and others. The shareholding structures 
of large companies are such complex networks. This research employed a 
network analysis tool which can quantify the decisions load on the corporate 
structure. Besides, the tool provides insights into the corporate structure which 
was not discovered in any study previously. A decade ago, the tools used to 
analyse a complex network were limited. Over time, these tools have evolved, 
and network analysis can uncover complex cross-shareholdings and pyramidal 
structures quantitatively. 
 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
 
The study of the ownership and control networks in the agribusiness sector can 
be a learning paradigm in agribusiness study, as well as to enhance 
multidisciplinary research.  Many studies on decision sciences did not assess 
decision-making patterns employing the methods used here.  
 
 
This study’s goal is to expand the understanding of what shapes a company’s 
decision-making, using a mixed method approach. The literature is mainly either 
quantitative or qualitative in its approach. Very few studies employed a mixed 
method and none focussed on agribusiness and networks, analysing and 
comparing decision-making behaviour of GLCs and FOBs.  
 
 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
 
 
The first chapter discusses the problems and the scope of this study. It also 
includes an overview of the agribusiness and plantation sector in Malaysia, as it 
is the dataset used in this study. The objectives and a logical framework are 
included in this chapter. These elements framed the research questions and the 
hypotheses. 
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Chapter two reviews and analyses the relevant theories and concepts of 
ownership structure. It also reviews publications related to the topic of 
corporations’ decision-making behaviour and network analysis.  
 
 
The third chapter explains in detail the methodology used to achieve the 
objectives of the study. It also discusses the data collection and data analysis. It 
explains the theory and the application of network analysis in the context of 
network centralities metrics and statistical method.  
 
 
The fourth chapter covers the results and discussions of the network analysis. It 
includes network topology and the network features for each company by 
ownership identity, i.e. either GLC or FOB. 
 
 
Chapter five provides the results and discussions of the network centrality 
metrics. This chapter covers the linear regression analysis. 
 
 
The sixth chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the findings that are 
related to the problems identified earlier. It presents the significant findings, 
limitations of the study as well as the implications of this study at the micro and 
macro levels.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEWS 
 
 
This study analyses the impact of ownership and control structure, based on the 
decision-making behaviour. This chapter reviews studies that have discussed 
this topic as well as theories related to ownership and control, corporate 
behaviour, and graph theory. The ownership and control concepts are used in 
this research to analyse decision-making behaviour of state and family-owned 
firms. Graph theory induces network analysis which can quantify decision-
making behaviour, based on these firms’ ownership and control structure.  
 
 
The first section of this chapter defines the key terms used in this study. These 
terms are used in many studies, and some studies may define them differently 
from how they are defined in this research.  
 
 
The second section presents the theoretical framework of this research. The 
remaining three sections review studies that discuss the influence of the 
ownership and control structure on decision-making behaviour, the ownership 
and control of GLCs and FOBs, and network theory and their application in 
similar fields of studies, such as financial power network, shareholdings and 
board of directors’ networks, and interlocking directorships between firms. 
 
 
2.1 Review of Definitions 
 
 
This section reviews the key terms and definitions used in this research. The key 
terms used are varied across disciplines. There are nine key terms employed 
here which are ownership structure, ownership and control, decision-making 
control, ownership identity/type, government-linked companies (GLCs), family-
owned businesses (FoBs), agribusiness and plantations, complex network, and 
centralities measures. 
 
 
Ownership structure  
 
The term ownership structure in this study refers to the form, topology and 
pattern of shareholding within companies and their subsidiaries, as well as their 
associate companies. It also refers to the position of any group of firms in relation 
to their controlling shareholders (Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, & Wolfenzon, 
2008). This research subscribed to this definition. 
 
 
However, there are other definitions of ownership structure, one of which is 
defined as ownership concentration, taking into account ownership share of the 
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most substantial owner (Amihud & Lev, 1999; Bunkanwanicha, Gupta, & 
Wiwattanakantang, 2016; Cull, Matesova, & Shirley, 2001; Daily & Dollinger, 
1992; Demsetz, 1983; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Ghazali, 2007; Hill & Snell, 
1989; Laeven & Levine, 2008; Leech & Leahy, 1991; Lim, 2012; Moebert & 
Tydecks, 2007; Prowse, 1992; Sharifi, 2014; Su, 2010; Thomson & Pedersen, 
2000; Zhao, 2010) or a fraction of the equity held (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The definition is common but this research does not refer to this meaning. 
 
 
There are two types of ownership structures that are observed in this research: 
pyramidal and cross-shareholdings structures. Companies with a pyramidal 
structure are those whose ultimate owner creates a chain of ownership that 
allows the owner to control some firms, even the ones in which the owner has 
no direct ownership. The dominant owner in this structure is, therefore, one 
wealthy entity. In this type of structure, a top-down chain of control is displayed; 
the one that sits at the apex is the ultimate owner and followed by layers of firms 
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Indirect ownership in this 
structure serves as a means to maintain control over a large group of companies 
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003).  
 
 
In other structures, when the businesses grow and the number of companies at 
the lower pyramid increases, the apex may lose the concentration of control 
(Ariffin, 2009). However, a pyramidal structure allows the apex to retain control 
of many firms despite the growth of the business. In that way, a pyramidal 
structure facilitates efficient channelling of resources (Bunkanwanicha et al., 
2016). Pyramidal structures are employed by both government-owned and 
family-owned companies.  
 
 
Cross-shareholding 
 
Cross-shareholding is a control structure where the firm owns shares in another 
company along the firm’s chain of control (La Porta et al, 1999; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). For example, firm A owns 15 percent shares in its shareholder firm B, and 
firm B owns 25 percent shares in firm A. However, this situation is not limited to 
family-owned businesses. It differs from a pyramid where the control of a group 
remains more distributed than concentrated. In complex ownership groups, 
cross-ownership structures or circular ownership patterns are hardly detectable 
(Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000). 
 
 
Ownership and control 
 
Control is defined by Chandler (1977) as the ability to decide the “basic long-
term goals and objectives of the enterprise and the adoption of courses of action 
and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals”. Control 
can be exercised in two forms, i.e. ownership and authority (Fligstein, 2001). 
Government as the owner would practice both forms of control as they have the 
ultimate authority. As for the family and private owner, this ownership form of 
control is common. Berle and Means (1932) highlighted that in an enterprise with 
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a large capital base, such as publicly-listed firms, a mere 10 percent equity 
ownership is sufficient to maintain control. The government, as the owner of 
companies, can exercise control in both forms, as they can own the companies 
and have authority over them. Meanwhile, the family and private owner can only 
exercise control by ownership. 
 
 
When deciding on strategies and size, firms have three dimensions of control: 
operating controls, market controls and strategic controls (Hill, 1988). Operating 
controls reflect control over operating functions, i.e. marketing, manufacturing, 
purchasing. Market controls are related to control in the sub-unit of the business 
or the subsidiaries in achieving their business performance indicator. Strategic 
controls are dimensions of control that allow firms to determine their directions 
and align them with the external and global situation.  
 
 
This study focuses on the last dimension. It should be noted that strategic control 
is associated with control over the company structure. If control over the structure 
of the company is efficient, so is its strategic control. 
 
 
The focus of this study is also on how strategic control is associated with 
structural control. Strategic control involves determining the direction of a 
corporation and aligning it with both external and global situations. Besides 
determining and aligning these corporate directions, the structure functions as 
the backbone. If structural control of a corporation is efficient, strategic control of 
decisions should fit in well. 
 
 
Decision-making control 
 
Decision-making control involves a substantial degree of influence over strategic 
choices (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Child, 1972; Miles, 1982). Some of the 
literature refers to this term as strategic planning (Ramanujam, Venkatraman, & 
Camilus, 1986; Robinson & Pearce, 1983). This research applies this definition.  
 
 
Decision-making is hierarchical and as the organisation becomes more complex 
and diversified, control and decision-makers become separated (Daniels, 1983). 
When there is a large number of companies, the volume of control from the 
decision-makers increases, but engagement between the top and bottom in the 
hierarchy is less and separated.  
 
 
Decision-making is based on goals or values and facts, as well as inferences 
based on goals and facts. The goals and values may be simple or complex, 
consistent or contradicting; facts may be real or assumptions, based on various 
sources; the inferences may be valid or invalid. These processes, referred to as 
‘reasoning’, should support the decisions (Simon, 1959). 
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The importance of ownership and control of a corporation justifies the decision-
making power, where the power resides in the voting shares (Martz & Semple, 
1985). The higher the shareholding, the stronger the power in decision-making. 
 
 
Network mechanisms shape organisational decision-making, depending on the 
mix of partners and activities in the structure (Owen-Smith, Cotton-Nessler, & 
Buhr, 2015). It contributes to the flow of interactions among various agents in the 
organisation. This is the point why this research applied network analysis as the 
method. 
 
 
In corporate environmental behaviour (CEB), a firm’s internal characteristics are 
crucial in delivering the responsible environmental outcome. These 
characteristics include their corporate structure. The firm’s characteristics is also 
referred to as firm capability (Sarkar, 2008). This research believes that firm 
capability is a reflection of its corporate structure. 
 
 
Ownership identity/type 
 
The term ownership identity or ownership type refers to who is the owner or 
major shareholder of the firm. Based on the identity, the firms studied in this 
research are divided into three categories; government-linked companies or 
state-owned enterprises (GLCs/SOEs), family-owned businesses (FOBs) and 
private businesses. Categories highlighted in other studies include widely-held 
financial institutions, widely-held corporations, cooperatives, and voting trust (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Laeven & Levine, 2008). In Asia, state-owned enterprises refer 
to government-linked-companies (GLCs) (Ang & Ding, 2006; Gomez, 
Padmanabhan, Kamaruddin, Bhalla, & Fisal, 2017). The data in this research 
are analysed according to this categorisation. 
 
 
Other categorisations exist, but are not relevant to this research. It includes state 
asset management bureaus, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the 
central government, SOEs affiliated to the local government, and private 
investors (Chen et al. 2009; Lu & Yao, 2006). Regarding SOEs, other ownership 
types comprise collectively-owned enterprises (COEs), and township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) (Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998). Some studies may 
define private owners as among the non-state, insiders are related to workers 
and managers, and outsiders are referred to as domestic individuals, legal 
entities, and foreign owners (Sprenger, 2007; Ferreira, Ornelas, & Turner, 2007).  
 
 
Government-linked companies 
 
This research uses the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)’s definition of government-linked-companies (GLCs) 
which is:   
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“…companies that have primary commercial objective and in 
which the Malaysian government has a direct controlling stake, i.e. 
the ability to appoint board members and senior management, 
make major decisions (e.g. contract awards, strategy, 
restructuring and financing, acquisitions and divestments) for 
GLCs either directly or through government-linked investment 
companies (GLICs). Hence, GLCs include companies where the 
government controls directly or collectively a controlling stake 
through state agencies… (and) includes companies where GLC 
themselves have a controlling stake, i.e. subsidiaries and affiliates 
of GLCs.” (OECD, 2013) 
 
 
This definition is consistent with that adopted by the World Bank. In its report, 
the World Bank defines GLCs as “companies where the government controls 
directly or collectively a controlling stake through state agencies” (World Bank, 
2012). 
 
 
Based on the definitions by the OECD and the World Bank, this research defines 
GLCs as companies that are under the majority ownership of the federal or state 
government. Majority ownership means 20 percent or more of a company’s 
equity ownership by one or several federal or state government entities.  
 
 
Family-owned businesses 
 
Family-owned businesses (FOBs) are businesses that are owned by a single 
individual – the owner-operator – who can accurately assess the firm’s 
processes; they are usually small firms (Churchill & Hatten, 1987; Daily & 
Dollinger, 1992). A family business is a system that includes the business, the 
family, the founder, and the board of directors (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). They 
are governed and managed to shape and pursue the vision of the business held 
by a dominant coalition that is controlled by members of the same family or a 
small number of families. These businesses are potentially to be passed across 
generations of the family (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). The ownership 
structure of FOBs is usually pyramidal (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). 
 
 
Other definitions of FOBs also involve family participation, and where the family 
has control over strategic decisions (Miller & Rice, 1967). The founder or his/her 
descendants run the company, with the intention of keeping the company within 
family control. FOBs have multiple generations of the family who are involved in 
the running of the firm, and some of these family members have managerial 
responsibilities (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997; Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; 
Zahra, Hayton, and Salvato, 2004). These definitions matched the scope for 
family-owned businesses for this research. 
 
 
FOBs are also defined as “a public or private company in which a family (or 
related families) controls the largest block of shares, has one or more of its 
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members in key management positions, and members of more than one 
generation are actively involved within the business” (Miller & LeBreton-Miller, 
2005). In this research, family-owned businesses are defined as a firm in which 
the substantial shareholders are family-related and managed by family 
members. There is no one definition fits all, so in this research, an integration of 
all these definitions is used for FOBs.  
 
 
Agribusiness and plantations 
 
Agribusiness refers to business operations involved in the manufacturing and the 
distribution of farm supplies; production operations on the farm; and the storage, 
processing, and distribution of farm commodities and items made from them 
(Davis and Goldberg, 1957).  
 
 
Research on agribusiness sectors focuses on two major topics; the coordination 
of participants within the food chain, known as agribusiness economics, and the 
study of decision-making within the food chain governance structures, known as 
agribusiness management. This study will focus on the latter.  
 
 
The term plantation in this study is understood as the cultivation of a limited 
number of crops. Plantation crops are perennial trees or shrub crops, such as 
tea, coffee, cocoa, oil palm, citrus, banana, rubber, coconuts, and certain field 
crops such as pineapples, sisal and sugar. Most of the plantations occupy land 
for more than six months. It is identified as the specific type of large farm. This 
research focuses on oil palm plantation. 
 
 
There are different opinions on the minimum size of land. The Plantations 
Convention in 1958 considered an estate that is larger than 5 hectares as a 
plantation. Malaysia and some other countries define plantation, by law, as 
having more than 40 hectares. There are three types of plantations: 
smallholdings, less than 10 hectares; small plantations, family-owned or small 
companies, at 10 to 500 hectares; large plantations, from 100 to thousands of 
hectares which are typically owned by the large national companies or state 
organisations (Tiffen & Mortimore, 1990). 
 
 
A plantation in this research, however, is not just a large farm. It should have 
integrated agricultural activities which require high capital-to-land ratio and 
includes research and development activities.  
 
 
Complex network 
 
A network is a set of items: nodes or vertices, and edges or links. The nodes 
represent the agents or actors of the network. The links represent the 
interactions between the actors. The analysis of networks is driven by the 
increasing availability of an enormous amount of data in the various fields of 
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research, such as neurobiology, genomics, ecology, finance, and many others. 
The advancement of computer tools and mathematics drives network analysis 
as an essential tool to uncover the behaviour of complex systems. 
 
 
A complex network consists of a class of networks or many 
interacting/interconnected parts (Glattfelder, 2010) which specify a structural 
feature by its connectivity and influences the dynamics of the interactions or 
processes in the networks (da Costa, Rodrigues, Travieso, & Villas Boas, 2007; 
Glattfelder, 2010). A complex network is described as a wide range of systems 
in nature and society. Among real life networks found empirically are the 
worldwide web, Internet, scientific collaborations, cellular networks, ecological 
networks, citation networks, linguistics networks, power and neural networks, 
protein folding, and financial networks (Albert & Barabasi, 2002). Natural, social 
and technological systems which show intricate patterns of connectivity between 
their units are also described as complex networks (Newman & Park 2003; 
Boccaletti, Latora, Moreno, Chavez, & Hwang, 2006).  
 
 
Back in the 1930s, sociologists realised the importance of connection between 
people to understand human society. Typical social network studies address 
issues of which individuals are best connected to others, or have the most 
influence, and how individuals are connected to one another through the network 
(Newman, 2001). Researchers in recent years developed a variety of techniques 
to understand the behaviour of these systems (Newman, Watts, & Strogatz, 
2002). The approach behind these complex networks is similar and based on 
graph theory.  
 
 
Centrality measures/Network metrics 
 
Centrality measures serve to quantify the nodes or links that are more crucial 
than others in the network (Koschutzki et al., 2005). Many types of such 
measures were introduced in the 1950s. These early discoveries opened the 
research path. Centrality can also be referred to as ‘influence’, or ‘control’, 
depending on the perspective of the networks. For example, a node can be 
regarded as central or influential if it is heavily required for the information 
transfer within the network (Koschutzki et al., 2005). The links or edges can be 
regarded as the lines to transfer the information. In this research, a node refers 
to a company or the individual who holds shares in the business. The weights 
are the percentage of the shareholding by the company or the individual.  
 
 
Centrality can be quantified as index/metric which is also referred to as the 
network structural index/metric. Here, it is referred to network metrics. These 
centrality metrics provide various perspectives to assess the network. 
 
 
Network metrics can be grouped based on the centrality classes. There are 
seven main network centrality classes, such as, distance and neighbourhoods, 
shortest paths, derived edge centralities, vitality, current flow, random 
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processes, and feedback (Koschutzki et al., 2005). The centrality classes are the 
network perspectives which quantified the links and interactions. Not every 
network centrality metrics are suitable for every application. 
 
 
This research deals with business decision-making control in large public-listed 
firms. The aim is to quantify and qualify the decision-making behaviour of the 
industry players. Betweenness and stress are selected as the primary centrality 
metrics in this research. It belongs to the centrality class shortest paths which 
will help the researcher to understand decision-making behaviour based on the 
interactions between companies in the network.  
 
 
Betweenness and stress are the (relative) number of shortest paths that contain 
the central nodes or/and edges (Koschutzki et al., 2005). Stress was introduced 
by Alfonso Shimbel in 1953. It referred to the ‘work’ done by each node in a 
communication network. Since then, stress is used to quantify the various links 
of communication paths. Stress is counting the absolute number of shortest 
paths in the network. This research represents stress as the decisions load in 
the companies. 
 
 
Betweenness can be viewed as a relative of stress centrality. It was introduced 
by Jacob Anthonisse in 1971 and Linton Clarke Freeman in 1977. Betweenness 
sums up the relative number of shortest paths for each pair of nodes. It can be 
regarded as the extent to which a node controls the communication between 
nodes. In this research, it is denoted as a structural control. A detailed 
explanation and equation will be presented in Section 2.5: Network Theories. 
 
 
Flexibility consists of the attributes of production technology which accommodate 
greater output variation (Stigler, 1939). Flexibility is based on a firm’s cost 
curves. Later, flexibility was redefined as a firm’s response to uncertainty, 
especially to market imperfections (Hart, 1942; 1965). There are many 
definitions of flexibility. In this research, the definition of flexibility is the ability to 
deal with all forms of turbulence in the firm’s business environment (Carlsson, 
1989). 
 
 
Flexibility in multinational corporations is about the flexibility to transfer 
resources, e.g. production capacity between locations in different countries as a 
reaction to environmental changes (Kogut, 1985). Three aspects of flexibility 
involved in the business are management (strategic), engineering 
(technological), and manufacturing (processes) (Carlsson, 1989). The 
management aspect is the focus of this research. This research also focuses on 
strategic flexibility, as classified by Carlsson. 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the theories which framed this research, and the methods 
employed to achieve the research’s objectives. The ownership structure of a 
company plays a significant role in determining the firms’ behaviour (Chandler, 
1962). Many types of research have acknowledged that the structure of a 
company determines their corporate strategies (Demsetz, 1983; La Porta et al., 
1999). However, the tools employed to analyse the ownership structure in 
previous research were limited.  
 
 
The ownership and control structure in GLCs and FOBs is complex and unclear. 
There are cross-interactions between the companies in the corporations. It is 
believed that concentration of control is in the hands of the owner. The decision-
making behaviour reflects the owner. However, to what extent is this notion 
valid? This research is designed to answer this question objectively. Many 
studies have dealt with the GLCs and FOBs (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; 
Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Dyer, 1988; Gomez & Saravanamuttu, 2013; 
Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, none 
of these studies employed network analysis as their mode of analysis. 
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Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework of the research 
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Due to this scientific tool’s advancement, it is now possible to analyse and 
understand a complex network. A complex network is analysed using a tool 
called network analysis. In this research, the network analysis consists of two 
main components: network topology and network metrics. Network topology is 
the visualisation of the nodes and links arrangement in the network. Network 
metrics are the parameters that describe the network in various perspectives. 
The focus will be on two network centralities metrics, betweenness and stress, 
which capture how the company is controlled and how much is the decisions 
load. These properties shape the results and the discussion of a company’s 
decision-making behaviour. 
 
 
The data on the shareholding’s structure was fed into the network analysis tool. 
This method was initially applied by Glattfelder (2010), then followed by Roda, 
Kamaruddin, & Tobias (2015). This research replicates the method in Roda et 
al. (2015), and expands the scope of analysis to the GLCs and FOBs, as well as 
the statistical modelling. Statistical modelling is to test the level of similarities or 
differences within and between the two types of ownership identity. 
 
 
The theories employed are to support and frame this research to answer the 
research questions. The research questions were developed according to the 
logical framework presented in Chapter one. 
 
 
2.3 Ownership Structure and the Decision-Making Behaviour 
 
 
“The central economic and policy problem is to allocate decision and 
control rights to parties who have the incentive and information to 
use resources efficiently to create wealth and ensuring the 
controlling parties are accountable to all other participants.” – OECD 
 
 
The above quote indicates that the decision-making behaviour of a corporation 
is critical in understanding how they allocate their resources efficiently. This 
research analyses the behaviour based on the interactions among the 
companies in the shareholdings network. 
 
 
Firstly, this section reviews previous work related to the scope of this research. 
Secondly, it highlights the gap between past studies and this research. The 
reviews are divided into three sub-sections: separation of ownership and control, 
interlocking ownership and control, and assessment of the corporate behaviour. 
Separation of ownership and control 
 
 
Miles et al. (1978) presented a theoretical framework to analyse organisations 
as an integrated and dynamic whole. They studied the interrelationships 
between strategy, structure and process. There are four strategic types of the 
organisation when solving problems, where each type has its unique strategy, 
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structure and process. They believed their framework benefited from 
organisational adaptations. This theory is significant in this research.  
 
 
There are two opposing arguments on the separation of ownership and control. 
The first argument states that the separation reflected in the decision-making 
process is one where the owner may have no control over the decisions as the 
corporations grow larger, and control lies in the hands of the firm’s managers. 
On the other hand, the separation did not exist and the ultimate owner still has 
significant control over the decision-making of the firm. This research attempts 
to provide perspectives where both arguments are valid based on the method 
that is employed. 
 
 
Many large corporations emerged and possessed resources and economic 
power which was previously dominated by the government (Lee, 1990). Lee 
(1990) relates this to Berle and Means’s seminal study in 1932 which states that 
a large number of owners could decentralise managerial control, as the 
ownership disperses. The separation of ownership and control significantly 
affects the decision-making structure in the firm. The transfer of information 
would not be efficient as the firm grows larger. Organisational hierarchy resulted 
as in loss of control at the top of the unitary form corporation (U-form) and 
centralised organisation. The multidivisional corporation (M-form) managed to 
solve the control loss by dividing their activities amongst a number of sectors 
(Chandler, 1982). According to Jensen and Meckling (1992), ownership structure 
is significant in determining a firm’s objectives, shareholders wealth and the 
discipline of the manager. 
 
 
The survival of organisations is characterised by separation of ‘ownership’ and 
‘control’ (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This separation is reflected in the decision-
making process for the survival of organisations. Decision agents are mostly in 
control without having ownership in the organisation. This is common among 
large corporations worldwide. There are four steps in the decision process: (i) 
initiation, (ii) ratification, (iii) implementation, and (iv) monitoring. Initiation and 
implementation are categorised under decision management, while ratification 
and monitoring are under decision control. Decision management and decision 
control each belong to a different agent. 
 
 
The managerial structure of banking corporations is reflected in the division of 
decision-making power in the banking sector in Canada (Martz & Semple, 1985). 
They suggested that the internal corporate structure influences the extent of 
interdependence between divisional and corporate headquarters and divisions. 
 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) tested their hypothesis contradicting the idea of Berle and 
Means (1932) on separation of ownership and control among large corporations. 
They identified the ultimate controlling shareholders of various large corporations 
in 27 wealthy economies and posed four critical questions. First, what is the 
current status of widely-held firms in different countries? Second, who are the 
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significant owners of these firms? Third, how do the owners secure their control 
over the firms? Fourth, what are the differences in the ownership patterns 
between countries? 
 
 
They identified the ultimate controlling shareholders based on ownership stakes 
and displayed the level of complexity of the ownership structure. The controlling 
shareholders have control over firms through pyramidal structures and 
participation in the firms’ management (La Porta et al., 1999). They found that 
the argument presented by Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of 
ownership and control of widely-held shareholdings is common mainly for large 
firms in the United States. This is not the case in most other countries, where the 
companies have an ultimate owner. Based on their findings, the most common 
ultimate owners of corporations are the state as well as families or their 
descendants. 
 
 
Interlocking ownership and control 
 
This sub-section reviews and explains how the ownership and control structure 
of a company becomes complex. It is not unique to a specific region, or specific 
business activity, but is diverse in nature. These diverse interactions contributed 
to the complexity of the ownership and control structure of a company. This 
research was able to visualise the complexity in the results presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 
In Malaysia, Lim Mah Hui (1981) highlights two types of shareholders: (i) 
personal shareholders (ordinary individual shareholders, director shareholders) 
and (ii) non-personal shareholders/institutions (corporations, nominees, 
trustees, investment companies, banks, public entrepreneur and others). The 
types of shareholders may determine the strategies of the company. Different 
shareholders may have goals other than maximising returns on their investment. 
The shareholding differences shape the complexity of the structure.  
 
 
Corporations are interconnected through: (i) interlocking stock ownership (by the 
types of shareholders, pyramiding), (ii) interlocking directorships, (iii) sharing of 
common management and secretarial agencies, (iv) common creditors, and (v) 
common purchasers/buyers. Interlocking directorates refer to situations in which 
one or more companies have one or more members of their respective boards 
in common. Directorship is a means to enhance ownership interest and control 
of the big owners who are also directors. It could be interlocking internally 
(interlocks between company within the same sector), and externally (interlocks 
between company from different sectors). At the time of Lim’s publication of his 
book, the computer tools available were limited and did not visualise the 
complexity of the structure. Nevertheless, he still managed to analyse the 
interlocking qualitatively and extensively.  
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The economic significance of interlocking are ownership interest, strengthening 
control, and other economic benefits. Ownership interest is achieved if the 
company shares a common principal owner. This ownership link will usually be 
accompanied by one or more director links (financial institutions maintaining 
control over the companies). Strengthening control over the economic 
environment (for environment control of tin, rubber, cement sectors) is crucial to 
squeeze out the competition, for price fixing, and to determine supply in the 
market. It is needed to coordinate strategies and actions, a process facilitated by 
sharing common directors. Government participation in economic development 
will generate extra economic benefits for the corporation. Hence it is important 
to maintain good state–corporation relations. 
 
 
Sonquist and Koenig (1975) presented the reasons of interlocking ties: (i) 
management control theory – to facilitate business and information sharing. In 
some industries, companies are subjected to more state regulations and 
concessions (tax exempt, tariff protection). (ii) Environmental control theory – to 
strengthen companies’ control over the market. (iii) Financial control theory – 
identified financial institutions are the core of the interlocking system. (iv) Class 
hegemony theory – represents a social network that binds members of upper 
class together. 
 
 
Sieh (1982) defined control by categories: (i) owner control if a 
person/family/group holds 80% or more of the company’s vote, (ii) majority 
control if a person/family/group owns between 50-80%, (iii) substantial minority 
if they hold 30%–50%, (iv) small minority if they hold above 5% but less than 
30%, (v) management control if they hold at least 5%, and (vi) undetermined, if 
large vote holdings are nominees. 
 
 
There are three types of control: first, external corporate control, dealing with 
regulations due to forces outside the company in the environment (e.g. 
government rules and law). Second, internal corporate control, which has 
ultimate and legally enforceable power to select or dictate the management of a 
company. It is done through the proper appointment of the board of directors 
(BOD), who create company policies and select top executives to implement 
decisions. It exercised by those who command the largest voting strength within 
the company, who may or may not be the shareholders. Internal corporate 
control could be carried out by shareholders who do not manage, managers who 
own shares, and managers who do not own shares. Lastly, internal business 
control, which has power over the actual deployment of assets and resources. 
This research focuses on the second control, internal corporate control.  
 
 
Sieh (1982) highlighted five types of ownership of shares: public companies, 
financial institutions, individuals – widely dispersed investors, financial 
intermediaries (small saving individuals), and government. The distribution of 
shares can also be classified according to the type of institution (individual, 
financialinstitutions, government, cooperative and private companies). Financial 
institutions here refer to investment companies, insurance, trustees and banks. 
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She regards share ownership data as an important piece to complete the puzzle 
of total wealth ownership in the economy. 
 
 
Lim and Sieh’s research work were done more than 30 years ago. However, the 
issue of their research is still relevant today. This research will fill the gap by 
providing new perspectives on the ownership structure of companies in 
Malaysia, by using the network analysis tool. This tool will provide new insights 
that may not have been discovered before. As companies evolved, so does the 
research done and the tools used to analyse them. 
 
 
Assessment of corporate behaviour/corporate governance 
 
Chapelle and Szafarz (2005) aimed to improve the methodologies in calculating 
the magnitude of separation between integrated ownership and integrated 
control among shareholders. They identified and defined the synthetic control 
ratios. Their study applied the calculations to Albert Frere’s empire, who is one 
of the influential business figures in Europe. They found that real power lies in 
the capitalistic system, designed for the complex structures found in Continental 
Europe and Asia. They suggested a graph theory to complement and enhance 
their method. This is one of the reasons for employing network analysis in this 
research. 
 
 
Obata (2003) highlighted some of the key attributes of a pyramid ownership 
structure (POS) as: (i) the ultimate owner has a larger cash flow ownership in 
the top firms rather than the bottom firms, 38.7 percent of 2980 companies are 
controlled through POS. Half of the 38.7 percent are controlled by families; (ii) 
the ultimate controlling family selectively decides to rescue a distressed firm on 
the top of the pyramid because it is perceived as the core firm; (iii) the bottom 
firms in the pyramid group get looted to prop up the top firms in the same group. 
When any of the top firms receive a negative shock, they channelled to the lower 
firms in the hierarchy; and (iv) group affiliation has a positive effect on the 
valuation of firms when a firm is in financial distress. However, this is only true if 
there is low quality of investor protection, a situation that prevails in many 
developing countries. This adds to the understanding of the features in the 
pyramid structure. 
 
 
Lee (1990) traced the development of theoretical work on corporate behaviour 
and the issues that need to be confronted. She mentioned that Williamson (1975) 
highlighted the problem of control in a firm. Williamson’s notion was that an 
expanding firm would have difficulties in transferring information between various 
departments effectively because of its operational complexities. This would lead 
the firm to increase the hierarchy, which would reduce effective control by the 
management. She concluded that theories of corporate behaviour are more 
diverse, more realistic, and more complex but less complete than in the 1930s.  
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The issues concerning ownership structure and corporate governance, 
ownership structure and owner influence, and owner influence and firm attributes 
have been integrated into the vast literature, but no specific method is mentioned 
(Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi & Certo, 2010). This research is designed to 
assess three aspects: owner influence, ownership structure and firm attributes. 
Network analysis is able to assess these issues, also used here to distinguish 
between corporations’ decision-making behaviour. 
 
 
From a financial point of view, shareholders who do not have enough control and 
influence over the management of the company can lead to inefficient 
governance. For example, splitting the equity into smaller units and allowing for 
larger amount of capital leads to imbalance control in the company. However, it 
prevents the expansion of control in the pool of people who can manage but are 
not wealthy (professional managers). If equity interest is broken into smaller 
portions and held by many investors, the capital providers can diversify the risks 
(Blair, 1995). Actual governance and control of corporations occur through a 
myriad of customs, cultural norms, and institutional arrangements that are not 
written, but may be heavily influenced by it. 
 
 
2.4 Ownership and Control of GLCS and FOBS 
 
 
This section reviews previous studies related to large corporations in the global 
and Malaysian contexts. Large corporations are vulnerable to governance issues 
because, usually, large corporations are public enterprises where part of their 
earnings come from the public. 
 
 
The discussion is followed by a section on the studies of ownership and control 
in GLCs and FOBs. It is to demonstrate their differences and/or similarities in 
terms of ownership and control. Based on these reviews, it is clear that there has 
been no research comparing the GLCs and FOBs. This research takes the 
opportunity to undertake this pioneering task to compare ownership and control 
related to decision-making behaviour of GLCs and FOBs. 
 
 
Large corporations and governance 
 
There were five developments of intense focus about corporate governance 
issues among large corporations (Blair, 1995). Firstly, the perception in the mid-
1980s was that US companies were falling behind their Japanese and German 
counterparts due to the rate at which they were investing in new plants and 
equipment. Secondly, came the wave of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, 
and corporate restructuring in the 1980s. Thirdly, there was a huge increase in 
standard compensation packages for corporate executives. Ballooning pay 
packages are evidence that executives are out of control. Fourth, there was a 
continued process of restructurings, boardroom shake-ups, and ‘downsizing’. 
Finally, the dramatic breakdown of the socialist economies of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union. Both the governance systems to manage and 
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control the newly-privatised industries as well as the legal and institutional 
infrastructure needed to support these governance systems and to protect and 
encourage further investment had to be created from scratch. 
 
 
There are three different clusters of views about corporate governance. The 
finance model – where a company is owned by shareholders and should, 
therefore, be managed in the interest of shareholders. However, as share 
ownership disperses, control over managers became challenging as managers 
often dominated resources. Secondly, managers are too attentive to the interest 
of shareholders. Financial markets are impatient and short-sighted, and prefer 
short run gains (shareholders). “Market myopia” companies underperform 
because they are too responsive to short-term pressure. Finally, corporate 
policies that generate the most wealth for shareholders may not be policies that 
generate the greatest total social wealth. This research does not delve into 
corporate governance issues specifically, but the findings would have an impact 
on corporate governance practices, especially in decision-making control. 
 
 
Separation of ownership and control raises four types of challenges involving 
governance. Firstly, management must be flexible in making strategic decisions 
and taking advantage of investment opportunities. In a company where 
ownership and control are not separated, it is easier to be flexible. Secondly, a 
small, close-tied group of shareholders with a large amount of shares might be 
effective in monitoring management, but they need to be restrained to prevent 
them from having an unfair advantage over other shareholders. Thirdly, time and 
resources are a major commitment to act as effective monitors. Many investors 
prefer liquidity and diversity which are not consistent with time and resources. 
Lastly, releasing certain types of information to the public can weaken a 
company’s competitive position. In this research, we highlighted the challenges 
of flexibility among the corporations related to their decision-making behaviour. 
 
 
Politically-driven business is a strategy pursued by most latecomers and a 
universally type of statism is applied to catch up with other corporations in the 
global economy. Political business can be a strategy to channel available funds 
to strategic industries in a late-starting and scarce capital country (Evans, 1999). 
A private entrepreneur has to respond to market events to maximise profit. 
Politically-driven businesses benefit from market profits, reward structures within 
party and state, and social and commercial demands from their constituencies. 
Government and big business ties are a symbiotic relationship (Hunt & Sherman, 
1972). Strategic trade policy/free trade leads to national prosperity and 
safeguards national interest by shielding the economy against outside influence 
through aggressive and discriminatory policies favouring domestic capital by 
putting ‘politics’ in command. 
 
 
There are four distinct patterns of capitalist development (Scott, 1997): (i) the 
Anglo-American pattern where financial institutions have become the principal 
shareholders. The intercorporate network in this pattern is central, and control is 
through a constellation of interest; (ii) The German pattern: mobilisation of capital 
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is through a banking mechanism that makes long-term capital available; (iii) The 
Japanese pattern: clustering of enterprises into tightly integrated sets within 
which capital is circulated from one another; and (iv) the Latin pattern: 
shareholdings of families, banks and investment companies. They are 
intersected by the mutually supporting way and form control patterns that allow 
a continuum of family influence within a more depersonalised investment funding 
system. Directly, the corporations involved in this research have the Japanese 
pattern and probably partly Latin American pattern. Indirectly, the Anglo-
American pattern is similar to GLICs ownership in GLCs, where the GLICs are 
the financial institutions of the government. 
 
 
The Malaysian context 
 
Due to limitation in the scope of this research, reviews of literature on ownership 
and control of GLCs and FOBs in Malaysia is weak. This is because most of the 
literature were focussed on the political business in a wide spectrum of economic 
sectors, not specific to the agriculture and plantations sector. However, there are 
some previous research that is highly related to what this research is focusing 
on. 
 
 
In the 1960s, Malaya’s market economy was ubiquitous (Puthucheary, 1960). 
His book highlighted post-colonial continuation of business activities 
characterised by a very small number of producers, and output was small. 
Medium-scale activities were most prominent in commerce, manufacturing and 
mining and they were dominated by the Chinese. 
 
 
Puthucheary (1960) highlighted that the focal point of control was the agency 
houses. The agency houses were the British trading and investment companies. 
The activities within the agency houses spread through the economy and they 
were active throughout the country. They were most evident in the agriculture 
sector as this was the primary sector in the country at that time. They controlled 
approximately 75% of two million acres of plantations. Their form of control was 
strengthened by an intricate interlocking of directorships of various rubber 
companies. 
 
 
The other sector that the agency houses dominated was commerce. They owned 
and controlled the production of exports. They dominated the country’s export 
trade (agriculture and smallholder produce). They controlled 25% of Malaya’s 
export which was a result of their ownership of companies involved in shipping 
and insurance. 
 
 
The basic unit of control was the managing agency. Many large secretarial firms 
set up holding companies which specialised in holding shares of rubber 
companies. Puthucheary (1960) presented the interlinking of the agencies 
through the different secretarial groups. This interlocking structure is similar to 
what is present today among the GLCs and GLICs. Three control mechanisms 
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stated in the book are: (i) the holding of shares in companies by agency houses 
and secretarial firms; (ii) the shares held by rubber companies, controlled by 
agency houses and secretarial firms in other rubber companies (inter-company 
holdings); and (iii) the shareholdings of investment trusts or holding companies.  
 
 
Puthucheary (1960) highlighted the ownership concentration and control 
structure of the Malayan economy. The agency houses played the most 
significant role in the economy as they owned and controlled most of the 
economic activities and secretarial firms. There was no information of the volume 
in ringgit or dollars held by the agency house; the book only mentioned this in 
percentage terms. The book provided evidence of interlocking directorships 
among agency secretarial firms. Puthucheary (1960) argued that there was a 
lack of understanding of the extent of control that agency houses, mining 
agencies and import agencies had over the economy of the country. 
 
 
In another study, by Sieh (1982), there are three mechanisms of control – inter-
company devices, constitutional devices, and interpersonal device. Inter-
company devices include multilayered subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries 
(pyramiding). It is divided mainly into the majority (>50%) and minority (<50%) 
shares ownership. It includes pyramiding, cross-holdings, and circular-holding. 
As for constitutional devices, the capital gearing will be high when the ratio of 
capital-to-share is high. It is also regarded as special class power. Lastly, the 
inter-personal device involved the voting agreement, a voting trust which is 
equivalent to trustees, irrevocable proxy and nominees’ device. This is in the 
form of corporate, nominee companies, bank nominees, insurance companies, 
trust companies, personal trustees and public trustees (Sieh, 1982). 
 
 
2.4.1 Government-Linked-Companies (GLCs) 
 
 
The first part of this sub-section reviews various ownership and control aspects 
found in the GLCs in Malaysia. Puthucheary, as noted, did a pioneering study on 
this topic. This was followed by studies by Lim (1981), Sieh (1982), and Gomez 
(1990) who discussed in detail the landscape of ownership and control of 
corporations in Malaysia. The reviews on related studies done in the other 
countries, where GLCs are referred to as SOEs, is presented later in this sub-
section. Based on these reviews, there is no study which specifically discussed 
GLCs or SOEs in the agribusiness and plantations sector. 
 
 
In Malaysia, the development of large enterprises was also attributed to 
privatisation, industrialisation and the promotion of Malay-owned conglomerates. 
The New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in 1970 to employ public 
enterprises, later called government-linked companies (GLCs), to venture into 
various sectors of the economy on behalf of the Malay Bumiputera (or “sons of 
the soil”). The primary focus of the NEP was to ensure more equitable distribution 
of corporate equity between the ethnic groups of this multiracial society (Gomez 
& Saravanamuttu, 2013).  
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In his pioneering study of ownership and control of major firms in pre-
Independence Malaya, Puthucheary (1960) showed the overwhelming 
dominance that foreign, mainly British, enterprises had over the Malayan 
economy in the early 1950s. From 1957, when Independence was attained, until 
the watershed events of May 1969, Lim (1981) noted that ownership and control 
of the corporate sector, particularly of the largest publicly-listed firms, remained 
in the hands of foreign enterprises. Chinese capital had a ubiquitous presence 
in the economy in the pre- and post-Independence periods, but in terms of 
ownership and control of prominent firms operating in the national economy, their 
strength paled in comparison to foreign capital.  
 
 
Lim’s (1981) analysis of the top 100 quoted firms in the 1970s made some other 
important points. Firstly, there was significant interlocking stock ownership 
among some prominent corporate groupings, indicating the concentration of 
control over the economy; this control was primarily in the hands of a few large 
firms. Lim’s study revealed that of the 100,000 shareholders in Malaysia’s 62 
large corporations, 797 of them – or a mere 0.8% – owned 69% of the RM1.4 
billion worth of equity. Within this group of 797 shareholders, the top one percent 
owned 29% of this RM1.4 billion equity, while the top 50% owned 97% and the 
bottom 20% only 0.4%. 
 
 
Secondly, Lim (1981) noted extensive interlocking directorships, identifying three 
types of directorates: owner-directors, executive-professional directors and 
functional directors. Owner directors were equity owners who also served as 
directors. Executive-professional directors were high-ranking employees who did 
not own a substantial stake in the firm. Functional directors were those usually 
appointed to perform “extra-economic functions”; these directors were usually 
former senior bureaucrats who could perform “advisory and brokerage 
functions”. Lim suggested that directorate interlocks were used “to strengthen 
control over corporations in which one has ownership interests.” Thirdly, 
although the government had attempted to develop domestic Bumiputera capital, 
more than a decade after Independence, no individual of the Malay ethnicity had 
emerged with a significant presence in the corporate sector. 
 
 
Gomez  (2002) raised questions about the sustainability of big business and 
drawing attention to the issues of  state intervention and business strategies. He 
believed that business strategies need some state intervention, but if it’s heavily 
conditioned by state policies, the business longevity and sustainability of the firm 
diminishes. 
 
 
Gomez et al. (2017) noted that government-linked investment companies 
(GLICs) have joint shareholding of a range of public-listed firms. However, in 
numerous cases, one of these GLICs has majority ownership of a quoted GLC. 
Block shareholding, including through obscure private firms, of listed enterprises 
is common among the GLICs. Block shareholdings help shield the collective 
majority ownership that GLICs have over major quoted companies. In a situation 
where a state has strong political influence, and through GLICs have ownership 
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in the listed companies, it is unlikely that private investors or even foreign 
enterprises will attempt to institute a takeover of these firms. The research was 
carried out systematically to assess the various mechanisms of control by the 
GLICs in the GLCs among the top 100 public listed companies. However, they 
did not demonstrate control in the decision-making explicitly through pyramiding 
and cross-shareholdings within and between the companies structures network 
like this research did. Focusing only on GLICs and GLCs in various economic 
sectors, no comparison were made with other companies with other ownership 
types. However, they included the illustration and computation of the power 
influence of the GLICs using Bonancich’s algorithm, where this research did not 
cover.  
 
 
Some quoted GLCs come under a holding company or a GLIC. These quoted 
GLCs, in turn, function as business groups, involving the use of a holding 
company – and, in some cases, cross-holdings and pyramiding – reflecting that 
this is an extremely important corporate control mechanism. Since GLICs 
function primarily as holding companies at the apex of a large number of quoted 
and unlisted firms, the concepts of business groups and pyramiding require 
thoughtful consideration.  
 
 
Leff (1978: 663) defines a business group as “a group of companies that does 
business in different markets under a common administrative or financial 
control”. Granovetter (1995), in a similar fashion, sees a business group as a 
corpus of firms, mutually bonded by varying degrees of legal and social 
connection, which transact in several markets under the control of a core firm.  
 
 
The organisational structure has a bearing on the firm in receiving the rent 
distribution. It involves an analysis of power centralisation. A high level of 
economic growth recorded by South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia had been attributed to the presence of a strong state. It enabled 
owners to achieve much autonomy from the state. It then contributed to a desire 
by capitalists to seek some influence over policy-making. 
 
 
State control over the financial sector had been important in determining the 
growth in the particular economic sector and certain corporate enterprises. For 
example, the use of tax breaks, access to bank loans and providing lucrative 
rents are some examples of the extent of state control. Control of a public-listed 
company permitted the rise of complex cross-holdings involving other quoted 
companies and private firms, thus facilitating rapid growth. 
 
 
A framework by Murtha and Lenway (1994) highlighted the government’s 
organisational capabilities, and how its political structures affected MNCs 
strategies and structures and showed why and how government policies affected 
managers’ choices. They highlighted that government ownership made firms 
more susceptible to the demands by citizens, such as social and political goals, 
ahead of efficiency and profit. MNCs prefer flexible strategies that do not depend 
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on government or political interests. However, in developing economies, the 
government leverages the inducement on the sector in which MNCs have the 
advantage. Target specificity, policy credibility, and institutional arrangements 
are the basis that drives state industrial strategy capabilities which would have 
an impact on MNCs. The study suggested that government-owned MNCs may 
have similar flexibility and be decentralised if the contracts are targeted 
strategically, the policies are consistent with MNCs strategies and driving the 
strategies within each other’s unique capabilities. Industrial strategies cover 
government plan to allocate resources with the intent to meet long-term national 
economic objectives. There are also opinions on why government should not 
command business to perform, but to induce (Lindblom, 1977). 
 
 
Questions about how we can understand and explain the power and the 
significance of big businesses have been raised in many parts of the world. It is 
challenging to explain because the identities of the real people who run the 
businesses and determine the strategies are elusive (Scott, 1997). The link 
between ownership and control has been broken. The owners who hold shares 
may become separated from any effective control of the business. Direct owner-
control gets weaker as the number of shareholders get bigger. This is due to the 
lower concentration of shares per shareholder. 
 
 
Zhao (2010) examined the impact of ownership type and ownership 
concentration of Chinese business groups on diversification strategies. The 
government-owned companies are more diversified compared to private 
ownership (Zhao, 2010). The author mentioned that his findings support the 
political/economic views on diversifications in emerging economies. Additionally, 
companies with higher ownership concentration are less diversified, due to the 
large shareholder groups acting as a control mechanism and ensuring that 
management acts to suit their interest. 
 
 
Li and Wu (2010) examined the relationship between board governance, 
ownership structure and company’s growth of small and medium-sized listed 
companies in China. Statistical analysis results showed that corporate 
governance indicators of different ownership structures have different effects on 
the company’s growth. For absolute control of the company, the study suggested 
that more institutional investors and market players participate in the company’s 
governance. They suggested that state-owned shares should be reduced and 
the supervisory role of government departments should be strengthened. 
 
 
2.4.2 Family-owned Businesses 
 
 
This sub-section reviews various ownership and control aspects found in the 
family-owned businesses. Unlike GLCs, the discussion and studies on FOBs’ 
ownership and control are limited. The following reviews indicate a gap is 
prevalent, i.e. no study has analysed the agribusiness and plantations FOBs’ 
corporate structures.    
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The family-owned company is a dominant type of company (Daily & Dollinger, 
1992). In the United States, about 80 percent of businesses are family-owned 
(Kirchoff & Kirchoff, 1987; Sexton & van Auken, 1982). Family-owned firms are 
relatively smaller than government-owned firms, as proven in the analysis by 
Daily and Dollinger (1992). The family-run firms are dominated by a strong 
individual character, who is reluctant to allow the firm to exceed his or her 
personal management competencies. Besides that, it is believed that the internal 
control systems in family-owned companies are less formal in which the owner 
could have personal control over shared control of the decisions. 
 
 
In publicly-traded companies in East Asia, it is evident that the ownership is 
between the government and the family (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 1999). 
The control chain of decision-making in these two types of ownership is complex, 
due to its structural complexity. Scott (1997) argued that business activities are 
progressively shaped by those who have large shareholdings and power to 
influence corporate affairs. Even though some individuals or families could have 
the same capability, in most cases the principal owner is another company or a 
financial institution. Financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, and 
investment companies, who have been important players in the capital market, 
have become dominant in share ownership. Furthermore, they created extensive 
inter-corporate capital relations in the advanced capitalist economies. 
 
 
The owners of Malaysia’s leading public-listed enterprises, predominantly 
families, have managed to build corporate empires through effective use of 
holding companies that facilitate interlocking stock ownership of corporate 
equity. In this system, the holding company need not own a majority of the shares 
of a public-listed company (PLC) to control the PLC’s decision-making. These 
quoted companies, in turn, tend to own and control a large number of unlisted 
enterprises and usually operate as business groups with equity interests in a 
range of sectors (Gomez & Jomo, 1997). Gomez (2002), in his book, 
recommended tracing the inter-relations between politics and business to 
determine their influence on enterprise development, corruption and 
consolidation of democracy in East Asia.  
 
 
Morck and Yeung (2004) discussed how control pyramids are used to exercise 
power in family firms. They believed that control through pyramids makes firms 
vulnerable to poor governance. Agency problems, family values, long-term 
planning and political connections are among the advantages of family firms 
highlighted by Morck and Yeung. On the other hand, they also discussed key 
issues related to pervasive family control and their implications. 
 
 
The limited literature on family-owned studies are due to several factors. Firstly, 
because of the wide acceptance of Berle and Means’s (1932) ideas in which 
control of businesses is in the hands of professional managers, not the family. 
Secondly, it may be due to difficulties in the multi-disciplinary study which 
focuses on family and business systems, and finally, due to a strong belief that 
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work and family systems exist exclusively here and is self-contained (Lansberg, 
Perrow, & Rogolsky, 1988).  
 
 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) examined the extent of differences in structure, 
process and performance based on ownership and control in small private firms. 
They tested the hypothesis that owner-controlled firms will outperform 
management-controlled firms. It was found that family-owned and managed 
companies exhibit performance advantage because of the unification of 
ownership and control. The data was collected through a field survey which could 
lead to perception-based answers which is a disadvantage as it is not 
representative of reality. 
 
 
Mansor, Che-Ahmad, Ahmad-Zaluki, and Osman (2013) compared family-
owned companies to non-family-owned companies. The comparison was to 
provide evidence on corporate governance mechanisms of the two groups of 
companies. Based on the statistical analysis, it is evident that both groups were 
using different corporate governance mechanisms to control earning 
management activities. 
 
 
Alwshah (2009) discussed corporate governance and agency conflicts of 
companies in Jordan, where most of the companies are family-owned. The firm’s 
ownership is concentrated with strong large shareholders among families, local 
financial institutions and foreign shareholders. There was no comparison made 
between family and non-family-owned firms in the study.  
 
 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) examined the relationship of corporate governance 
mechanisms and performance between publicly-listed family-owned and non-
family-owned firms. They used the market measure, Tobin’s q, and accounting 
measures such as return-on-assets, and return-on-equity as their performance 
measurement. Parameters of corporate governance mechanisms were gathered 
from companies’ annual reports such as board size, independent directors and 
duality. The study concluded that family ownership is governed differently from 
non-family-owned firms.  
 
 
Family firms are the most common form of business organisation in the world 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). It is acknowledged by many researchers all over the 
world (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Favero, Giglio, Honorati, & Panunzi, 2006; 
Gorriz & Fumas, 1996; Gursoy & Aydogan, 2002; Mishra, Randoy, & Jenssen, 
2001; Sraer & Thesmar, 2006; Yeh, Lee & Woidtke, 2001). In these studies, it 
was found that family firms have superior performance compared to non-family 
firms.  
 
 
In Malaysia, family-owned companies constitute over 43 percent of the main 
board companies of the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur 
36 
 
Stock Exchange (KLSE)) from 1999 to 2005. However, studies examining the 
shareholdings structure of family-owned firms are very limited.  
 
 
Abdul Rahman (2006) highlighted that many listed firms in Malaysia are owned 
or controlled by a family and that these companies appear to be inherited by their 
descendants. Since independence, most Malaysian companies have been 
controlled by foreigners. Small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) in 
Malaysia are managed by the founder, and they have anchored funding and 
employment on the family (Jasani, 2002). Their business activities are 
concentrated on trading, manufacturing and retailing, and non-intensive capital 
business. There are also SMEs that are opposed to anchoring employment to 
the family.  
 
 
Indeed, the firms were led by the founder with activities concentrated on trading, 
manufacturing and retailing. Jasani (2002) found that 59% of the businesses in 
Malaysia are still managed by the founder while 30% are run by the second 
generation, where the majority are the children of the founders of these SMEs. 
The founder’s reign is highlighted, with 65% of them linked to the SME. 
 
 
Chu (2009) examined the influence of founding-family ownership on SMEs 
performance. The question of the founding-family ownership being detrimental 
or beneficial for small firms was raised. It was found to be an effective 
organisational structure for SMEs in Taiwan, despite its negative effects. Among 
the negative effects discussed in this paper are the possibility of agency 
problems occurring, lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities among managers, 
institutional overlapping, the mentality of work to benefit their interests first, and 
succession challenges. 
 
 
2.5 Network Theories 
 
 
The section reviews previous network analysis research in various fields of 
research. This research employs network analysis because to break down the 
complexity of the ownership and control structure of both GLCs and family-
owned companies. Pyramidal business groups and interlocking shareholdings 
are among the main features of this issue involving complexity. The reserach 
aims to uncover the complexity and to understand firm behaviour, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Past studies did not explore the shareholdings 
structure of a company to relate it to decision-making behaviour. This is where 
this research fills the gap. 
 
The mathematical representation of networks originates from graph theory1 
(Gribkovskaia, Øyvind, & Laporte, 2007). The graph is usually used to present 
                                                          
1 Leonhard Euler, the most eminent mathematician discovered graph theory 
through a solution to Seven Bridges of Konigsberg in 1736. 
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basic properties of networks in a mathematical sense. A network is a structure 
which consists of a set of objects, called nodes and edges or links (Figure 2.2). 
The links between nodes can be directed or undirected. Directed links refer to 
the denoted parameter, while undirected links have no denominator. Links can 
also be weighted, representing the qualification of the denominator. A group of 
nodes and links form a cluster which typically shares similarities in the main 
activity. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Example of a network 
(Source: Roda et al., 2015) 
 
 
Network analysis is an emerging tool that offers both micro and macro 
perspectives of any complex relationship systems. The perspectives can be 
measured from a single node and linked the entire network systems. This tool is 
suitable for analysing and conceptualising organisations, interpret social 
behaviour and characterise linkages or relationships/interactions. There has 
been vast expansion of the theory of complex network in recent years. Applying 
network analysis to the financial structure is new and the potential is being 
explored. It has been applied to a wide range of studies, e.g. in the fields of 
molecular biology, physics, finance and sociology. For example, in the field of 
biology, the network analysis is applied to molecular and genetic interaction 
datasets and generates powerful visualisations across the data sets. 
 
 
In the social science field, it can analyse large and complex social relationships 
and integrate it with other tools for advanced analysis. The application of network 
analysis varies between disciplines. It has proven to be a powerful tool to 
understand large and complex interactions. Serrat (2009) stated that “social 
networks are nodes of individuals, groups, organisations, and related systems 
that tie in one or more types of interdependencies: these include shared values, 
visions, and ideas; social contacts; kinship; conflict; financial exchanges; trade; 
joint membership in organisations; and group participation in events, among 
numerous other aspects of human relationships.” It quantifies the hidden 
connections. The network perspective was already hypothesised in the literature 
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on corporate control (Chapelle & Szafarz (2005); Faccio & Lang (2002); 
Glattfelder & Battiston (2009); La Porta et al. (1999)). 
 
 
Network analysis can handle a vast amount of data, within a complex system, 
consisting of interacting components whose collective behaviour cannot be 
explained by the individual units (Newman, 2001). These components may act 
according to rules that may change, and the outcome may not be easily 
understood. Examples of a complex system include human brains, societies, 
ecological systems, economy and financial markets (Newman, 2010). 
 
 
2.5.1 Simple Network Metrics 
 
 
This research is an attempt to develop a detailed network metrics that is suitable 
for financial and management perspectives. The objective of this research is to 
explore a whole range of possible metrics which could open some new 
perspectives to allow new possibilities or analysis to go deeper.  
 
 
An embedded application in the software called “NetworkAnalyzer” which can be 
used to compute various network metrics. NetworkAnalyzer (the plugin program) 
computes a comprehensive set of topological metrics for undirected and directed 
networks. The plugin program computes simple and complex network metrics 
which we reassigned as topological parameters. The simple network metrics are: 
the number of nodes, edges, and the connected components, the average 
number of neighbours, the network diameter, radius, density, centralisation, 
heterogeneity, clustering coefficient, the number of shortest path, and the 
characteristic path length. The complex network metrics are: distributions of 
nodes degrees, neighbourhood connectivities, average clustering coefficients, 
topological coefficients, shortest path lengths, and shared neighbours of two 
nodes. The complete set of simple and complex parameters are referred as 
network statistics (Assenov, Ramirez, Schelhorn, Lengauer, & Albrecht, 2008).  
Table 2.1 shows the definitions of the various network metrics for a 
shareholdings structure that was adapted from Roda et al. (2015). He modified 
the definitions to a business and economics point of view. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Network centrality metrics and its business and economic 
meaning 
Network metrics Definition 
Network diameter  
 
 
It is the largest tier rank of subsidiaries or 
shareholders, both vertically and horizontally.  
It measures the largest distance between two 
companies within the ownership structure. 
Hierarchy index  It is the reciprocal of % of shortest paths. The 
higher it is, the more hierarchical the ownership 
structure is. The structure forms pyramids of 
tiered subsidiaries.  
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Number of nodes The size of the group by a number of 
companies. 
Average shortest path 
length (average ownership 
tier) 
The average shortest distance between two 
companies within the ownership structure. It is 
the average tier rank of subsidiaries applicable 
to both vertically and horizontally. 
Indegree (Shareholdings 
degree) 
The number of shareholders a corporation has. 
Outdegree (Subsidiaries 
degree) 
The number of firms in which a shareholder has 
invested. 
Betweenness centrality The number of shortest ownership lines 
between two companies passing through one 
company, compared to all the shortest 
ownership lines in the network. It is an index of 
the actual control exerted by one company over 
the ownership structure. 
Stress The absolute number of shortest ownership 
lines passing through one company. It is an 
index of the decisions’ load of the business 
group.2 
 
 
In this research, hierarchical index is defined as the reciprocal of percentage of 
shortest paths in the corporation network (Roda, et al, 2015). The higher the 
percentage, the less hierarchical the ownership structure is. The structure forms 
pyramids of tiered subsidiaries. 
 
 
There are three types of hierarchy in exist in the complex network structure 
(Mones, et al., 2012). They are; the order, the nested and the flow hierarchies. 
This research focused on the flow hierarchy, where the nodes are layered in 
different levels which have influence through the connected edges. 
 
 
Krackhardt (1994) provided an elegant definition of the meaning of hierarchy, 
and developed measures of that. He defined a pure, "ideal typical" hierarchy as 
an "out-tree" graph from a directed graph which all points are connected, but one 
node (“the "boss") has an in-degree of one. The simplest "hierarchy" is a directed 
line graph A to B to C to D, and so on. More complex hierarchies may have wider, 
and varying "spans of control" (out-degrees of points). He raised, to be a pure 
out-tree, there can be no reciprocated ties.  Reciprocal between two actors imply 
equality, and this denies pure hierarchy.  However, it could still be assessed 
through the degree of deviation from pure hierarchy by counting the number of 
pairs that have reciprocated ties relative to the number of pairs where there is 
any tie; that is, what proportion of all tied pairs have reciprocated ties. This 
assessment justified our calculation which based on the percentage of the 
shortest path of the network (Hanneman, et al., 2005). 
                                                          
2 The meaning may differ from the original document. It has been modified to 
suit the context of this research. 
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2.5.2 Centralities: Shortest Paths 
 
 
Centrality metrics have an extensive history in social science as a structural 
characteristic of nodes in a network, and it depends on the nodes’ position in the 
network (Bonacich, 1972; Freeman, 1978; Hubbell, 1965). Centrality is the 
extent to which a network is centred on a node. For example, in a star-shaped 
topology network, the central node has the highest centrality, and all other nodes 
have minimum centrality. 
 
 
Centrality is an essential concept in network analysis (Borgatti & Everett, 2006). 
There have been many works on centrality measures in various fields of study, 
such as physics, biology and economics (Freeman, 2008; Schweitzer et al., 
2009). It is to analyse and understand the functionality of a complex network 
system (Scardoni & Laudanna, 2012).  
 
 
This research uses centrality metrics as proxies to quantify decision-making 
control. There are many types of centrality measures that have been developed 
as mentioned in section 2.5, but this research focuses on betweenness and 
stress centrality metrics. Each of the metrics is discussed in detail as follows. 
 
 
Table 2.2 depicts the description of network metrics which is employed in this 
study. Network metrics are divided into two segments, simple metrics and 
advanced metrics. Simple metrics refer to the measurement of the direct physical 
topology structure (see Table 3.3 in Chapter 3). On the other hand, the advanced 
metrics, as shown in Table 2.2, are often referred to as centralities measures. 
There are variations of centralities measures, such as shortest paths, degree, 
distances to neighbourhoods, to name a few (Brandes and Erlebach, 2005). 
Each of the centralities employed different method of calculations. 
 
 
This research was working with the shortest paths centralities. It measures the 
most important links and units found in the network. Shortest paths have many 
types of metrics, betweenness, closeness, stress, eccentricity, and others. 
Betweenness and stress were chosen as the centrality measure for this research 
because they measure important links between companies that reflect decision-
making control behaviour.  
 
 
Table 2.2: Shortest paths centralities employed for this research and their 
meanings 
Network 
Metrics 
Equation 
Economic 
meaning 
Description 
Betweenness 
centrality 
 
∑𝑖 ≠𝑗 ≠𝑘  
𝜎𝑖𝑘 (𝑗)
𝜎𝑖𝑘
 
 
Structural 
control 
The number of 
shortest ownership 
lines passing through 
a company, compared 
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to all the shortest 
ownership lines. It is 
an index of the real 
control exerted by a 
company over the 
ownership structure. 
Stress centrality 𝜎𝑖𝑘(𝑗) 
Decisions 
load 
An absolute number of 
ownership lines 
passing through a 
company. It is an 
index of the time taken 
to apply a decision to 
the group, or an 
internal transaction 
cost. 
(Adapted from Roda et al. (2015)) 
 
 
Where, i, j, k are companies;, σik is the largest distance between i and k, σ; ik is 
the shortest distance between i and k; while σik (j) is the shortest distance 
between i and k and passing through company j. 
 
I. Betweenness 
 
The betweenness of a node n is calculated by considering couples of nodes (v1, 
v2) and counting the number of shortest paths linking v1 and v2 and passing 
through a node n. Then, the value is related to the total number of shortest paths 
linking v1 and v2. Thus, a node can be transverse by only one path linking v1 
and v2, but if this path is the only connecting v1 and v2 the node n will have 
higher betweenness score. It means that the node, for certain paths, is crucial to 
maintaining node connections. It measures the importance of a node for two 
connected nodes. The ‘high’ and ‘low’ scores are more meaningful when 
compared to the average value of the network. The mathematical equation for 
betweenness is as follows: 
 
𝑔 (𝑗) = ∑𝑖 ≠𝑗 ≠𝑘  
𝜎𝑖𝑘 (𝑗)
𝜎𝑖𝑘
  3.1 
 
Where, i, j, k are companies; σik is the shortest distance between i and k; while 
σik (j) is the shortest distance between i and k and passing through company j. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Example of betweenness centrality metric 
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Betweenness centrality assessed the extent to which the actor lies in the shortest 
paths between other actors. The important idea is that an actor is central if it lies 
between other actors on their shortest paths. The actor that has high 
betweenness must be between many actors (Badar et. al, 2013). Betweenness 
index has been extensively used in various social analysis involving large scale 
complex networks (Rajasingh et al., 2009). It includes identifying key actors in 
terrorist network (Krebs, 2002; Cisic et al., 2000), organizational behaviour 
(Bulkley & Alstyne, 2004), supply chain management (Coffman et al., 2004), and 
transportation network (Guimer, et al., 2005). 
 
 
In co-authorship networks, betweenness shows how close the sub-network to 
which the author belongs and how important the author’s role as a an agent (Yan  
& Ding, 2009). A high betweenness score would also indicate an actor’s potential 
to act as a gatekeeper of resources between the actors they connect in a network 
(Marks, et al., 2013).  
 
 
In economic terms, betweenness compares the number of shortest ownership 
lines passing through one company, to all the shortest ownership lines. It 
measures the importance of the ownership lines through the one company 
across the whole network. The higher the betweenness score, the higher the 
importance of the links between the nodes.  The more important the nodes which 
have important links in the network, the higher the structural control of the 
companies in the corporation’s shareholdings network. Betweenness is an index 
of the structural control exerted by one company over the ownership structure. 
In this study, we regard betweenness as a structural control index. The terms 
will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
 
II. Stress  
 
Stress calculation is by measuring the number of shortest paths passing through 
a node. To calculate the stress of a node v, all shortest paths in a network are 
calculated by the number of shortest paths passing through v. A ‘stressed’ node 
is a node traversed by a high number of shortest paths. Notably and importantly, 
a high-stress value does not imply that the node v is critical to maintaining the 
connection between nodes whose paths are passing through it. ‘High’ and low’ 
stress score for nodes are more meaningful when compared to the average 
stress in the network. The mathematical equation for stress is as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑘(𝑗)                  3.2 
 
Where, i, j, k are companies; σik (j) is the shortest distance between i and k and 
passing through company j. 
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Figure 2.4: Example of stress centrality metric 
 
 
Stress metric is to assess the work done by each node in a communication 
network. The number of shortest path linked the nodes give an estimate amount 
of stress for a node, assuming that communications are carried out through the 
shortest paths all the time (Rajasingh et al., 2009). A node has a high stress if it 
is pass through by a high number of shortest paths (Centiserver, 2017). 
 
 
In economic terms, stress centrality shows the absolute number of shortest 
ownership lines passing through one company. The number of lines represents 
the decisions that are reflected from the ownership ties. The more the number of 
lines, the more decision making is involved, the more ‘stressful’ the company. 
We regard it as a decisions load index to the company. Load means when a 
node sends / carries a unit amount of some commodity to other node (Brandes, 
2008). In this research, the commodity is the decision control via the shares 
owned. 
 
 
2.5.3 Network Analysis Software 
 
 
The research employed Cytoscape software for the network visualisations and 
its analysis. It was initially released in 2002 and undergone numerous 
development. It is an open source platform for visualising and analysing complex 
networks and integrating it with any type of attribute data. Cytoscape core 
distribution provides a basic set of features for data integration, analysis and 
visualisations (Shannon, et. al, 2003). It has additional features, called Apps or 
plugins, which available for network profiling, various layouts, and connection 
with other databases. Most of the Apps are free and available at Cytoscape App 
Store. The software was developed based on JAVATM technology, making it 
compatible to Windows and Mac users. 
 
 
Custom node illustrations provide a new tool for non-programmers to create 
specific new network visualizations that integrate large and complex datasets. 
Equations provide a powerful mechanism for data transformation within 
Cytoscape. Combining these features is useful to embed rich visualizations of 
data within the nodes of large networks (Smoot, et al., 2011). 
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2.5.4 Application of Network Theories in Similar Field of Studies 
 
 
This section highlights the evolution of various concepts employed in this 
research – in ownership structure, decision-making behaviour, ownership and 
control in GLCs and FOBs, and network theories. 
 
 
The economic crises that are happening in various regions suggest that it is 
timely to revisit and reconfigure our understanding of the economic system. 
Economic systems are increasingly built on inter-dependencies, implemented 
through transnational credit and investment networks, trade relations, or supply 
chains that have proven complex to predict and difficult to control (Schweitzer et 
al., 2009). It makes economic networks study more relevant, to facilitate and 
design the policies that can reduce conflicts and have a global impact. 
 
 
Glattfelder and Battiston (2009) questioned whether the distribution of power in 
the structure is fragmented or integrated. He asked who the key economic actors 
are, and what \the role of financial institutions was. He discussed changes in the 
macro behaviour from the interactions of the system’s elements at the micro 
level. He emphasised that complex systems have interacting/inter-connected 
parts. It is represented by the graph/map (nodes – agents, links – interactions). 
He focused his work at three levels of network analysis: topology, financial 
network and ownership network. The results revealed a complex ownership 
network pattern with a lot of cross-shareholdings (see, for example, Japan’s 
keiretsus and South Korea’s chaebols). Glattfelder classified this as a bow-tie 
structure and distinguished who controls the world based on its position in the 
bow-tie structure (top 50 list corporations). 
 
 
Bonacina et al. (2014) employed graph and network theory in the study to 
decipher shareholdings and board of directors’ networks to understand corporate 
governance ties. They found that the core of Italy’s shareholdings networks 
comprised banks and financial institutions, which had the highest eigenvector 
centrality values. On the other hand, the core of board of directors’ network is an 
industrial group of companies. The method was considered successful in 
analysing complex interrelations.  
 
 
Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battiston (2011) discussed how the structure of the control 
network of MNCs affect global markets competition and financial stability. The 
results showed MNCs form a giant-bow-tie structure and a large portion of 
control flows to a small tightly-knit-core of financial institutions. It is like an 
economic ‘super-entity’ that raises new important issues. Complex network 
analysis is needed to uncover the structure and control and its implications. 
Economic networks are growing in attention since a decade ago. Examples of 
economic networks are a network of trade, products, credit, stock prices and the 
board of directors. These researchers focused their efforts on a study of the 
linkages among financial institutions which have an ambiguous outcome on the 
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issue of financial fragility. Combining network topology with control ranking can 
bring full characterisation of the decision-making control structure. 
 
 
De Masi and Gallegati (2012) carried out an empirical analysis of the Italian 
system of banks and firms using network theory. They found that the architecture 
of this economic network shows unusual types of behaviour. The topology 
structure plays a crucial role in bankruptcy diffusion.  
 
 
Howard (2009) presented visually ownership changes for the global seed 
industry from 1996 to 2008. It was to improve the understanding of the current 
structure and to characterise them accordingly. He analysed the strategies 
employed by the companies to achieve greater control over the seed sector. He 
found that the concentration of power was incompatible with renewable 
agriculture practices. 
 
 
Connelly, Limpaphayom, and Nagarajan (2012) studied the relationship between 
control, ownership structure and firm value in publicly-traded companies in 
Thailand in 2005. Based on their results, they concluded that families control 
firms through pyramidal ownership structures that can allow firms to comply with 
preferred governance practices with significant control. 
Chen (2012) investigated the effect of ownership structure on firm performance 
in Scandinavian countries. She used Tobin’s q and Marginal q as valuation 
measures. The findings were that ownership concentration has a positive effect 
on firm profitability and growth, and a negative effect on firm valuation and risk; 
divergence between voting right and capital right has a positive influence on firm 
valuation; and owner identities do influence firm performance in profitability and 
growth. 
 
 
Levy (2009) described and compared different methods to determine the actual 
control of a firm, and he applied the chosen method to a Belgian retail company. 
He used graph theory to define ownership structure in mathematical terms. He 
then described the voting game using game theory. The results showed how the 
ownership structure allowed the Colruyt family to keep their control in the 
company despite discordances inside the family. 
 
 
Boutchkova and Cueto (2007) analysed corporate ownership structures of 
Canadian enterprises from 1998 to 2006. They found that pyramidal ownership 
structures in Canada are more dynamic than understood before. Their findings 
suggested that apex families modify the structures of their pyramid to achieve 
easier intra-pyramid flow of funds. They used graph theory to compute the 
measures describing the ownership structure. 
 
 
Moebert and Tydecks (2007) identified the most powerful companies based on 
ownership stakes in Germany. They measured the power of companies by 
centrality concepts in network analysis. Their work is based on the company 
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network literature and corporate governance. They used the MAN-classification 
scheme when analysing the networks. It measures the micro network formations 
and concurrently provides access to a macro view of a network. Their results 
showed that most central German companies are banks and insurance 
companies. They believed that future analyses of ownership structure could be 
enhanced by network tools and network statistics. 
 
 
Salvaj and Lluch (2011) compared ownership and control composition of the 
largest firms in Argentina and Chile using social network analysis. Their results 
focused on the networks of firms in both countries in the 1970s. They also 
compared the interlocking directorship and ownership pattern in banks in both 
countries. They extracted the important structural parameters of the networks. 
Chile showed more interlocks and links with big companies in their network, 
which provided more opportunities for control. Argentina has more broad 
business groups, which have fewer links. They presented the top ten most 
central firms in both countries, using Bonacich’s (1987) centrality measure. Both 
countries displayed different patterns of central firms. In Chile, most of the central 
firms were family-owned, and as for Argentina, only four firms were local 
business groups. They found that Chile’s business groups were more central 
than Argentina’s. The study’s limitation is its entirety in the companies’ 
shareholdings data. 
 
 
Bohlin (2012) investigated the possibility of summarising the clusters of share 
ownership in the Swedish stock market. She used network analysis to detect a 
community with similar interest, or similar pattern of ownership in the network. 
She found the best cluster structure in compressing the flow of information in the 
network. Finding significant patterns in the ownership data is possible. 
 
 
New measures were proposed to describe the ownership structure of a business 
that goes beyond the standard measures of cash flow and voting rights. The new 
measures included the position of the firms and the centrality of a firm in a 
complex network (Almeida, Park, Subramanyam, & Wolfenzon, 2008). 
However, none of these studies uses network analysis to explain decision-
making behaviour of corporations based on their ownership structures. Given the 
cases of complex structures in firms and the economy, this study employed a 
neutral and versatile tool, network analysis, to understand the behaviour of 
companies, specifically in their decision-making. 
 
 
This study is grounded on established theories and case studies. Based on the 
theories and far-reaching methods, the study is constructed to meet the stated 
objectives.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
 
 
The detailed method of the research is presented in this chapter with 
explanations of the procedures used for data collection followed by the data 
analysis. Both research activities are grounded within the theoretical framework 
presented in the previous chapter. 
 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
 
 
Companies’ shareholdings data were collected from various sources in  
understanding the link between ownership structure and company’s strategy 
including decision-making behaviour. This research collected data from the 
major public listed companies in the agribusiness and plantations sector. There 
are 41 plantation companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
for the year 2013. The study focused on the biggest eight agribusiness and 
plantations corporations, and they were selected based on their market capital 
value and their ownership type. The total number of companies involved in this 
study was 4,331 inclusive of subsidiaries and shareholders. The eight 
companies’ market capital value constitute 80% of the total market capital value 
of the plantation sector in 2013. It justified the data adequacy and its relevance 
to the plantation sector.  
 
 
Bureau Van Dijk, a Swedish company, provides business information through 
their databases such as Orbis, Oriana and Osiris for companies around the 
world. The research gathered ten levels of shareholdings data for all of the eight 
major plantation companies in Malaysia from the Osiris and Oriana business 
database for the year 2013. Osiris provides business information for all of the 
public-listed companies around the world. Oriana provides the business 
information for all companies in the Asia Pacific region. Information from Oriana 
was retrieved for 2015. This is because the database provides the company’s 
information at the current year of access. There are insignificant differences in 
shareholdings information for the year 2013 and 2015.  
 
 
The reason for gathering ten levels of shareholdings data is that network analysis 
requires an extensive data to be able to compute the network centrality metrics 
as precisely as possible. This research depends on the extensive data feature 
to map the extensiveness of the corporate structure to identify and compare the 
control in the business decision-making involving government-linked companies 
and family-owned companies. As for Osiris and Oriana, the research only 
counted the direct shareholdings. The indirect shares were not counted as it will 
lead to misinterpretation at the analysis phase. However, the companies that 
have indirect shareholdings in the main company were noted. 
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The data was also collected from the company’s audited annual reports and the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM). Some of the data that could not be 
obtained from the two databases (Osiris and Oriana) were complemented by the 
data gathered from these sources. The soft copy of the audited annual reports 
for the year 2013 was obtained from the company’s website. The shareholdings 
information were extracted and compiled. The research extracted information on 
corporate structure, the board of directors, and the history of the establishment. 
 
 
The Companies Commission of Malaysia provides information for private limited 
companies established in Malaysia. Their service was requested and obtained 
for those enterprises that were not listed in the Osiris and Oriana database. The 
information gathered were the list of shareholders and subsidiaries of the private 
limited companies. 
 
 
3.2 Research Materials 
 
 
The study focused on the eight biggest plantations companies: Sime Darby 
Berhad, IOI Corporation Berhad, Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad, Boustead 
Holdings Berhad, Genting Plantations Berhad, Kulim Berhad, IJM Plantations 
Berhad and Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad. The companies are major players in 
the world compared to other players in the region as indicated in Table 3.1. The 
study selected the highest market capital value in the plantation sector for both 
GLCs and FOBs, as they are the major players in agribusiness and plantations 
sector. 
 
 
In 2014, Malaysia’s palm oil producing companies made up 57% of the total 
market capitalisation of top palm oil producing companies in the world. 
Indonesian companies contributed 14%, and Singaporean based companies 
had 28% of the total market capitalisation. This shows that Malaysian companies 
have a significant control over the world’s palm oil industry.  
 
 
Both market capital value and land bank area indicate the size of the companies. 
Out of 16 global players in the sector, nine are from Malaysia – four are GLCs 
and FOBs, respectively, and one is privately owned. 
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Table 3.1: The world’s top palm oil producing companies in 2014 
Company Country 
Market 
capitalisation 
(million USD) 
Land bank 
(‘000 ha) 
Wilmar Singapore 14.6 243 
Sime Darby Malaysia 12.2 986 
IOI Corp Malaysia 7.1 217 
KL Kepong Malaysia 6.2 270 
Indofood Indonesia 5.4 224 
Golden Agri Singapore 3.4 451 
Astra Agro Indonesia 2.4 297 
Genting Plantations Malaysia 2.0 238 
United Plantations Malaysia 1.4 59 
Kulim Malaysia 1.2 91 
Boustead Holdings Malaysia 1.1 83 
London Sumatra Indonesia 0.8 177 
IJM Plantations Malaysia 0.7 80 
Sampoerna Agro Indonesia 0.2 240 
Bakrie Sumatera Indonesia 0.05 154 
Jaya Tiasa Holdings 
Berhad 
Malaysia 0.005 63 
 
Total 59.3 3,879 
Note: The companies listed are ranked by their market capital value. 
 
 
3.2.1 Shareholdings structure 
 
 
Table 3.2 illustrates the corporations’ shareholdings information for the selected 
eight companies. The ownership was based on the percentage of shares owned. 
Shareholders were divided into three groups; family, government and private. 
Shares held by the family consisted of the shares owned by the relatives of the 
founders or directors of the holding companies. Government shareholders 
constitute any federal or state government-linked investment companies 
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(GLICs). State government-linked investment companies include the Johor 
Corporation, Perak State Agriculture Development Corporations, and others. 
Nominees companies, banks, and insurance companies are grouped under 
others. The ownership type was determined based on the majority shareholdings 
between the shareholders. 
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Table 3.2: Corporations’ shareholdings information 
Corporation 
name 
No. of 
companies in 
the study 
Percentage of shares (%) by shareholder 
group Ownership type 
Majority 
shareholder 
Family Government Others 
Sime Darby 750 0 59.22 24.86 GLC 
Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad 
(National Equity 
Corporation) 
Boustead 1359 3.88 65.86 11.6 GLC 
Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera 
(Armed Forces 
Savings Fund) 
IJM Plantations 426 2.45 70.37 20.69 GLC IJM Corporation 
Kulim Berhad 105 9.84 72.48 14.64 GLC Johor Corporation 
IOI Corporation 647 45.79 10.96 29.88 Family 
Vertical Capacity 
Sdn Bhd 
KL-Kepong 505 46.86 16.68 23.2 Family 
Batu Kawan 
Berhad 
Genting 
Plantations 
487 59.83 21.9 25.66 Family Genting Berhad 
Jaya Tiasa 89 22.77 0 53.37 Family 
Tiong Toh Siong 
Holdings 
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Each of the corporation’s shareholding structure is illustrated in Figure 3.1 to 
Figure 3.8. The figures were drawn to show the percentage of shareholdings for 
the major shareholders in the corporation. The figures are configured as a 
directed network, where the arrows targeted indicate the percentage of shares 
owned. It displays the decision-making links within the corporation. It also shows 
the various designs of ownership structures of all eight companies.  
 
 
Sime Darby Berhad 
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, Sime Darby Berhad is majority owned by Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB), a significant GLIC. The shares owned directly by PNB 
are 11% and indirectly through Amanah Saham Nasional Berhad (ASNB) are 
35.15%. ASNB is a wholly-owned subsidiary of PNB. It was established in 1979 
to manage unit trust funds launched under PNB. There are no cross-
shareholdings seen at the shareholders level. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major 
shareholders in Sime Darby  
 
 
Sime Darby Berhad is a multi-billion dollar corporation, based in Malaysia, 
operating in 26 countries. It is involved in five core sectors: plantation, industrial 
equipment, motors, property, and energy and utilities. Figure 3.3 shows their 
global business footprint in 2017, spreading over 18 countries. The plantation 
sector contributed 37% of the total revenue of the company in 2009, then it 
decreased to 25% in 2013. This was due to the drop in commodity price in those 
years. Figure 3.2 illustrates the oil palm plantation area in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Liberia for 2013.  
 
 
Sime, Darby & Co was founded in 1910 by English planters: Alexander Guthrie, 
Daniel Harrison, Smith Harrison, Joseph Crosfield, William Sime, Henry 
d’Esterre and Herbert Mitford Darby. It has a long history of acquisitions and 
consolidations since its establishment. In 2007, Sime Darby, Guthrie and Golden 
Hope merged and re-entered the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange under the name 
of Sime Darby Berhad. 
53 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Sime Darby’s Oil Palm plantation area year 2013 
(Source: Sime Darby 2013 Annual Report) 
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Figure 3.3: Sime Darby’s Footprint in 2017 
(Source: Sime Darby’s official website, http://www.simedarby.com/who-we-are) 
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Boustead Holdings Berhad 
 
Boustead Holdings Berhad (Boustead) is owned by Lembaga Tabung Angkatan 
Tentera (LTAT) with a 58.69% share as shown in Figure 3.4. LTAT is a statutory 
body under the government. Unlike other GLCs, Boustead is the only GLC that 
has its director, Che Lodin as the shareholder. Che Lodin holds multiple 
directorships in LTAT and Affin Holdings, where Boustead is a major 
shareholder. No cross-shareholdings can be observed, but there are interlocking 
directorships. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major 
shareholders in Boustead Holding 
 
 
Its business operations are diversified, mainly in the plantation, property, finance 
and investment, pharmaceutical, trading and industrial, and heavy industries. 
The plantation sector contributed 6% of the total group’s revenue in 2013. The 
trading and industrial segment contributed the highest revenue to the group with 
47%. Figure 3.5 showed the planted and mill area for Boustead Holdings in 
Malaysia. 
 
 
Boustead was founded by Edward Boustead in 1828 in Singapore. Boustead 
began trading rubber in 1911. It has undergone a series of acquisitions and 
consolidations. It was listed on the Stock Exchange in 1961 under the name of 
Boustead & Co. In 1976, the company became a wholly-owned Malaysian entity.  
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Figure 3.5: Boustead Holdings Oil Palm plantation area in Malaysia 
(Source: Boustead Holdings 2013 Annual Report) 
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IJM Plantations 
 
IJM Plantations Berhad is owned by IJM Corporation with a 55.11% share as 
shown in Figure 3.6. IJM Corporation’s major shareholder is the Employee 
Provident Fund (EPF), a Malaysian government agency. IJM Plantations and 
IJM Corporation showed a business group link. Unlike Sime Darby and 
Boustead, IJM Plantations is a majority-owned subsidiary of IJM Corporation. 
There is no cross-shareholding seen in the IJM business groups, but the pyramid 
ownership structure is clear between the two companies.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major 
shareholders in IJM Plantation 
 
 
IJM Plantations Berhad entered a joint venture with Koperasi Pembangunan 
Desa in 1985 to develop Desa Talisai in Sabah. Since then, IJM Plantations’ land 
bank in Sabah has been increasing and has expanded to Indonesia. They regard 
themselves as a ‘boutique’ oil palm agribusiness based in Sabah. IJM 
Plantations contributed 9% of the total IJM Corporation’s total revenue. The 
biggest revenue contributor to IJM Corporation is the property business division 
with a 37% share (IJM Corp., 2015). Figure 3.7 shows the IJM Corporation’s 
global reach. Plantations businesses are mainly in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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Figure 3.7: IJM Corporation’s Footprint in 2017 
(Source: IJM Corporation’s official website,https://www.ijm.com/the-ijm-story ) 
 
 
Kulim (M) Berhad 
 
As seen in Figure 3.8, Kulim (M) Berhad is 54.88% owned by Johor Corporation, 
the Johor state-owned investment company. Kulim is the only state-owned 
company studied in this research. However, the shareholdings pattern is similar 
to Sime Darby and Boustead.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major 
shareholders in Kulim 
 
 
The history of the company began with the incorporation of Kulim Rubber 
Plantations Ltd in 1933 in the United Kingdom. In 1947, the company started to 
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operate a rubber plantation in Johor state. Johor State Economic Development 
Corporation (now known as Johor Corporation) became a shareholder in 1976. 
The core businesses are: plantation, oil and gas, intrapreneur ventures, and 
agro-food. Figure 3.9 shows Kulim’s global business footprint in 2013. The 
plantation segment of the business contributed 90% of the company’s total 
revenue in 2013. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Kulim Berhad’s Footprint in 2013 
(Source: Kulim Berhad 2013 Annual Report) 
 
 
IOI Corporation Berhad 
 
As shown in Figure 3.10, IOI Corporations’ (IOI Corp) major shareholder is 
Vertical Capacity Sendirian Berhad (44.67%), a private company owned by IOI 
Corporations’ founder, Tan Sri Lee Shin Cheng. The strong control links is clear 
through Progressive Holdings in IOI Corporations through Vertical Capacity. 
There are three directors which hold shares in IOI Corporation, and they hold 
shares in Progressive Holdings. There is a clear cross-shareholdings structure 
in IOI Corporation through its directors. 
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Figure 3.10: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by 
major shareholders in IOI Corporations 
 
 
IOI Corp is under the IOI Group. IOI Corp is a fully integrated company involved 
in plantation and resource-based manufacturing. The company is among the 
largest plantation owners in the industry. The resource-based business focuses 
on oil refineries, the production of oleochemicals, and specialty oils and fats. In 
2013, the revenue contributed to the group by its plantation segment is 41%. 
This is an increase from 21% inrom 2012. Its property segment is the second 
biggest revenue contributor to the group with 33%. Figure 3.11 illustrates the 
corporation’s global presence. Plantation business is mainly in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. 
 
 
IOI Corporation was incorporated in 1969 and was listed in 1980. It ventured into 
palm oil plantations in 1985. IOI Corporation is a fully integrated company in 
plantation and resource-based manufacturing. The resource-based business 
focuses on refineries, oleochemicals, and speciality oils and fats. 
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Figure 3.11: IOI Corporation’s global presence 
(Source: IOI Corporations 2013 Annual Report) 
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KL Kepong Berhad 
 
The chart in Figure 3.12 shows that Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad (KLK) is 
46.57% owned by Batu Kawan Berhad, an investment holding company. Batu 
Kawan Berhad is 47.73% owned by Arusha Enterprise which in turn is owned by 
Wan Hin Investments holding 77.4%. Wan Hin Investments’ major shareholders 
are also the Directors at KLK. There is a distinct pattern in shareholdings 
ownership in KLK compared to IOI and other GLCs. There are four companies 
linked to Wan Hin Investments which is then linked with Arusha Enterprise. Two 
companies are directly owned by Lee Oi Hian, while the other two companies 
are owned by Lee Hau Hian. They are the sons of Lee Loy Seng, the founder of 
KLK.  
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Figure 3.12: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major shareholders in KL Kepong 
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KLK started as a plantation company more than 100 years ago. Today, the core 
business is still in plantation (oil palm and rubber) with oleochemicals 
manufacturing. Its business in the plantation sector contributed to 45% of the 
group’s revenue in 2013, whilst manufacturing contributed 51% in 2013. Figure 
3.13 shows the operation locations in 2017 for three main businesses, 
plantations, manufacturing and properties. 
 
 
KLK started as Kuala Lumpur-Kepong Amalgamated Limited (KLKA) in 1960. 
Kepong (Malay) Rubber Estates Ltd. was acquired by the Kuala Lumpur Rubber 
Company Limited (incorporated in London) and formed KLKA.  Lee Loy Seng, a 
tin miner’s son from Ipoh, bought the KLKA’s undervalued shares, and in 1970 
its control, management and operations were transferred to Malaysia. In 1973, 
under the Scheme of Reconstruction, Lee Loy Seng was appointed as the 
Founding Chairman of KLK. It was listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
in 1974. Today, the business is under the stewardship of the second generation 
of Lee’s family. The core business is still in plantations (oil palm and rubber) 
besides oleochemicals manufacturing. 
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Figure 3.13: KL Kepong Berhad’s 2017 locations of operations 
(Source: KL Kepong official website, https://www.klk.com.my/company-profile/ ) 
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Genting Plantations 
 
Genting Plantations is 53.55% owned by Genting Berhad as is evident in Figure 
3.14. Genting Berhad is in turn owned by Kien Huat Realty Sdn Bhd with close 
to 39.52%. Kien Huat Realty is a private company that is held by Lim Goh Tong’s 
(the Genting founder) family. Genting Berhad is the investment holding and 
management company of Genting Group. Kien Huat Realty is 94.2% owned by 
Parkview Management, and the shareholders of Parkview Management are Goh 
Tong’s family. 
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Figure 3.14: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major shareholders in Genting Plantations 
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Genting Plantations and Genting Singapore PLC are subsidiaries under Genting 
Berhad. Genting Plantations was formerly known as Asiatic Development 
Berhad, one of the fastest growing plantation company. In 1980, Genting 
Plantations became a wholly owned subsidiary of Genting Berhad. Genting 
Berhad’s plantation business is its leading core activity. Figure 3.15 shows the 
business locations in 2013. Genting Plantations has ventured into the property 
development and biotechnology industries. In 2013, Genting Plantations 
contributed 8% of the total group’s revenue. Genting Malaysia Berhad was the 
largest contributor with 49%. Genting Malaysia Berhad is involved in the leisure 
and hospitality business. 
 
 
Genting Highlands Berhad was founded in 1965. Genting Highlands Berhad 
expanded from its hotel and resort business to plantations, power generation, 
and oil and gas exploration. Genting Plantations was listed in 1982 and has 
ventured into property development and the biotechnology industry.  
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Figure 3.15: Genting Plantation’s oil palm business locations in 2013 
(Source: Genting Plantations 2013 Annual Report) 
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Jaya Tiasa Berhad 
 
Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad is 21.37% owned by Tiong Toh Siong Holdings 
(Figure 3.16). Tiong Toh Siong Holdings is in turn owned by Tiong Hiew King 
and his family. Genine Chain Limited and Asanas Sdn Bhd also owns Jaya Tiasa 
holding 9.41% and 9.02% respectively. Since Asanas is wholly owned by Genine 
Chain, this shows a circular shareholding pattern within Jaya Tiasa.  
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Figure 3.16: Percentage (%) of shareholdings (a directed network) by major shareholders in Jaya Tiasa 
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Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad is a fully integrated timber producer in Malaysia. 
The principal activities are investment holding, oil palm plantation and crude 
palm oil milling, and timber products manufacturing. In 2013, 25% of the total 
revenue came from oil palm operations, and 75% came from timber operations. 
 
 
Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad is one of the prominent members of the Rimbunan 
Hijau Group. In 1993, Berjaya Textiles Bhd was sold to Tiong Hiew King, the 
founder of Rimbunan Hijau Sdn Bhd. In 1995, Berjaya Textiles Bhd changed its 
name to Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad whose headquarters is located in Sibu, 
Sarawak. Its shares were publicly listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
in 1997. Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad is a fully integrated timber producer. Its 
principal activities are investment holding, oil palm plantations and crude palm 
oil milling, and timber products manufacturing. Figure 3.17 shows the land area 
spreading over 10 plantations for Jaya Tiasa oil palm business in Sarawak. 
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Figure 3.17: Jaya Tiasa’s oil palm business division 
(Source: Jaya Tiasa 2017 Annual Report) 
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3.3 Data Analysis 
 
 
The shareholdings data gathered from the various sources were exported to 
Cytoscape, an open source network analysis software. There are other 
softwares available to compute social analysis and network metrics, such as 
Pajek and Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009; de Nooy, Mrvar, & 
Batagelj, 2005; Smoot, Ono, Ruscheinski, Wang, & Idekar, 2011). Cytoscape 
was used for this study for its heavy-duty capabilities in the handling and 
visualisation of large amounts of data (Roda et al., 2015). 
 
 
The below figure (Figure 3.18) illustrates the main work process for data analysis 
in this research. It started with the shareholdings data collection, then to data 
input to Cytoscape software for the network analysis. The data was arranged 
according to the format accepted by the software. Network Analyzer analysed 
the shareholdings data and provides individual metrics for each company, as 
well as for the main holding corporation as a group metrics. Both individual and 
group metrics were further analysed using statistical test. Scatterplot matrix were 
employed to discover which of the metrics has significant relationship and 
meaning. Based on the results in scatterplot matrix, the significant metrics were 
further analysed using statistical test and linear regression to get a clearer and 
precise analysis of the metrics relationship. On top of that, the research analysed 
the results visually using default network layout and hierarchical layout to 
supplement the statistical test results.  
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Figure 3.18: Work process for data analysis 
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3.3.1 Network analysis 
 
 
Based on the previous Figure 2.2 (page 57), a node represents a company or an 
individual who owned shares in the corporation. An edge represents the 
percentage of shares owned by the company or the individual. The central node 
is the main corporation. A cluster is a group of companies that have cross-
shareholdings. These perspectives are helping to break down the complexity of 
companies’ interconnectedness in their shareholdings structure. In the context 
of this study, companies and shareholders are the nodes, and the link between 
them is shareholdings. Network analysis can help us to understand the 
concentration of power and decision-making within the business group. 
 
 
Since the ownership and control structure of palm oil corporations are complex, 
the study integrated the data analysis with the network tool which is able to 
uncover the shareholdings complexities. Uncovering the person/entity who 
makes the decisions in a group is not easy due to this complexity. According to 
Cross, Liedtka and Weiss (2005), through the analysis of social networks, a 
study can obtain important information by uncovering the actual ownership 
structure of the company.  
 
 
Cytoscape is a software that is able to analyse data into network interaction 
visuals and analysis. It is an open source platform, started in 2002. Although the 
software was originally designed for biological research, now it evolved into a 
general platform for complex network analysis and visualisations. The software 
provides a basic set of data integration, analysis and visualisations features. It 
also has Applications, knows as Apps, as additional specific features for the 
users. This study employed the Cytoscape version 3.4, and analyse the data 
using Network Analyzer which is built in as the basic set feature. Network 
Analyzer analysed the centralities metrics, Betweenness and Stress, among 
other simple network metrics, from the shareholdings data.  
 
 
In this research, the shareholdings data were visualized in two types of layouts. 
Firstly, the default network layout where the nodes indicate the company in the 
corporation, and the edges indicate the amount of shares owned. The edges 
were colour coded, red (91-100%), orange (61-90%), yellow (30-60%), and 
green (less than 30%). The layout shows the topology of the corporation’s 
ownership structure and gradient of shares concentration within the corporation. 
Secondly, the hierarchical layout where the nodes were arranged hierarchically 
based on the shares owned through the edges. The layout demonstrates the 
pyramidal level of the corporation. Both of these layouts can be discussed further 
by referring to the network metrics, as shown in the above Table 3.3. 
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3.3.2 Statistical analysis 
 
 
Statistical analysis were divided into three parts; (i) the correlation matrix of the 
network metrics, (ii) the t-test for the significant network metrics, and (iii) linear 
regression modelling. Three analysis were carried out to compare and discuss 
the relationship of the network metrics in the ownership structure and the 
decision-making behaviour of the eight corporations. 
 
 
Correlation matrix 
 
After exporting the data into Cytoscape, the NetworkAnalyzer generated a range 
of network centrality metrics. To understand the relationship between network 
centrality metrics, a correlation matrix was drawn for all the network metrics 
generated by NetworkAnalyzer in Cytoscape. There are eleven network metrics 
that were correlated, as shown in Figure 3.12. They are; average shortest path, 
clustering coefficient, closeness, eccentricity, stress, betweenness, 
neighbourhood connectivity, outdegree, indegree, radiality, and eigenvector. 
Based on the correlation result, betweenness and stress (outlined in red) show 
a striking pattern of a linear relationship. The research decided to further analyse 
the betweenness and stress metrics. 
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Figure 3.19: Correlation matrix scatterplot for network metrics 
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T-test 
 
The metrics were tested for the t-test to understand the differences and 
similarities of the decision-making behaviour among the eight companies. The 
purpose of t-test is to test the level of difference between the companies. The 
test was made for betweenness and stress metrics, and the slope and the 
intercept of the linear regression. Based on the t-test results, the research made 
detail inferences on the decision-making behaviour differences and similarities 
among the corporations. 
 
 
Simple linear regression 
 
A linear regression model was developed (equation 3.3) to quantify and provide 
a more in-depth understanding of betweenness (structural control) and stress 
relationship (decisions’ load). The model is the indicator for predicting the 
decision-making behaviour of the corporations.  
 
Structural control (C) =  function of decisions’ load (S) 3.3 
 
(I) Local model 
 
The model was applied to all eight corporations individually (equation 3.4). This 
model is classified as local models as it applied to each company’s dataset. Each 
local model has separate values of a (slope) and b (intercept) for each company. 
Therefore, the model gives eight different values of slopes (a) and eight different 
values of intercepts (b). We regard a and b as “local parameters”. 
 
C corp =  f(Si corp, 𝑎 corp, 𝑏 corp) 3.4 
C corp =  𝑎 +  𝑏 (Si corp) 3.5 
 
where, 
 
Cicorp =  Structural control of an agribusiness corporation 
acorp    =  slopes 
bcorp    =  intercepts 
Sicorp     =  Decisions’ load of an agribusiness corporation 
i       =  a subsidiary/shareholdings unit 
 
The local models infer the individual firms’ decision-making behaviour. A single 
explanation is crucial to understanding firms’ behaviour. It would be more 
impactful if we could unite the local models to a global or common model, which 
able to represent all companies with a single notion.  
 
(II) Global model 
 
The global model is applied to one dataset that represents all firms’. The local 
model parameters were studied to identify the possibility of developing a global 
model. Based on the local model regression results, it was found that all slopes 
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have a similar value, close to 1 (Refer Chapter 5, Table 5.4). This suggests that 
it is possible to develop a global model. 
 
 
In a global model, there is only one value of the slope (a), for all corporations 
while having eight values of intercepts (b). The global model is: 
 
Ci corp = f (Si corp, a, b corp) 3.6 
 
The study generalised the writing of the model as: 
 
Ci corp = f (Si corp, a global, b local)   3.7 
 
where: 
 
Cicorpx   =  structural control of agribusiness corporations 
a           =  slope for all agribusiness corporations 
bcorpx     =  intercept of an agribusiness corporation 
Sicorpx      =  decisions’ load of agribusiness corporations 
i            =  a subsidiary/shareholdings unit 
 
The study regards a as a “global parameter” because it has the same value for 
all corporations. However, we still have bcorp1 to bcorp8 as local parameters. 
Overall, the model has become a global model since it has, at least, one global 
parameter. 
 
 
These parameters in the global model explain the decision-making behaviour for 
each company as well as for the whole group. 
The differences between global and local model are  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE TOPOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter highlights the answers related to the question of attributes of the 
ownership structures of GLCs and FOBs that inform decision-making control. It 
also emphasises the similarities and differences of the GLCs’ and FOBs’ 
ownership structures.  
 
 
The first section presents the topology metrics that describes each of the 
government- and family-owned companies’ ownership structure. It presents the 
network topology graphs in two layouts. The first layout is a star-topology and 
the second is a hierarchy-topology. Both layouts highlight different analyses.  
 
 
The second section deals with comparison of the topology metrics of the 
ownership structure for GLCs and FOBs as a group. It presents both GLC and 
FOB network layouts on a bigger scale, to analyse the similarities and 
differences between and within GLCs and FOBs. 
 
 
The third section presents the results and analysis for the whole agribusiness 
and plantation sector in Malaysia. It compares the GLCs and FOBs as a group. 
 
 
4.1 Company’s Share Ownership Structure 
 
 
4.1.1 Government-linked Companies 
 
 
Each network topology has a feature revealed by the network metrics. The 
network topology metrics presented in the tables in the following section are 
selected for discussion. Whilst there are many other network metrics computed 
in the network analysis, these simple metrics are chosen based on its suitability 
to this research’s scope. Betweenness and stress will be discussed in the next 
chapter as they are categorised as advanced metrics. The discussion focuses 
on each company. 
 
 
The detailed definitions of the metrics are in Table 3.3 (Chapter 3). To summarise 
briefly, network diameter shows the business groups’ pyramidal tiers. Average 
ownership tier indicates the ownership tier by a company in the business group. 
The bigger the tier, the longer the flow of the decision-making. Subsidiaries 
degree display the number of subsidiaries owned by the main holding company. 
The more subsidiaries the company has, the wider the decision-making control 
in the structure. Shareholdings degree shows the number of shareholders by the 
main holding company. The more shareholders the company has, the more 
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viewpoints or influence it has over the decision-making (Glattfelder, 2010). 
Hierarchical index indicates the level of hierarchy in the business group structure. 
The higher the hierarchical index, the longer the decision-making flow is. The 
number of nodes represents the number of companies in the business group 
which is involved in this research. The bigger the number of companies, the 
heavier the decision-making’s load in the main holding company. 
 
 
Sime Darby Berhad 
 
Based on results in Table 4.1, Sime Darby Berhad has nine pyramid tiers. Each 
company in Sime Darby has 1.4 tier of ownership which reflects a small flow of 
decision-making. It reduces the possibility of inefficiency in the decision-making 
control, as it has one-to-one control. It has the most extensive subsidiaries 
degree among all GLCs. It exhibits the heavy load of the main holding company 
when the level of ownership is short but the subsidiaries degree is big. Sime 
Darby has 29 shareholders, relatively low among the GLCs. It indicates low 
influence in the decision-making control by the shareholders. The hierarchical 
index shows the extent of the hierarchies in the company. Sime Darby is 92% 
hierarchic, which is considered as very hierarchical. This is reflective in the 
pyramid level of the network. The more pyramidal, the higher the hierarchical 
index. The number of nodes are the number of companies visualised in the 
network. The structural properties showed by the network topology metrics is 
imbalanced, which leads to discrepancies in its decision-making control. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Sime Darby network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
SIME DARBY 9 1.44 499 29 92% 736 
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Figure 4.1: Sime Darby shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.2: Sime Darby shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout  
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the topology network structure for Sime Darby Berhad. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates that most of the subsidiaries are concentrated at the core 
company, Sime Darby Berhad. It shows that the decision-making process and 
control are very much centralised at the main holding company, as Sime Darby 
is a highly diversified business group. From the topology structure above, it is 
clear that the decision-making control comes from the main holding company at 
the centre.   
 
 
From Figure 4.1, it is clear that Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) holds high 
control through its investment schemes in Amanah Saham Nasional Berhad 
(ASNB). ASNB holds a fraction of the ownership for PNB through various 
schemes. However, in total PNB holds 45.15% of ownership in Sime Darby, 
which makes it the substantial shareholder that may hold a higher amount of 
control/influence in the company’s decision-making. 
 
 
Sime Darby’s topology also shows a cluster group of companies. The only public-
listed company here is Eastern & Oriental Berhad (E&O), a construction and 
property development company. E&O was ranked 98 in 2013 in Bursa’s top 100 
list by market capitalisation. Sime Darby bought 30 percent of E&O in August 
2011 from Tham Ka Hon and GK Goh Holdings Ltd, a Singaporean company. In 
July 2013, Sime Darby had 31.96 percent of E&O’s equity. However, in 2016, 
Sime Darby disposed of its shares in E&O, with Tham re-emerging as a major 
shareholder. 
 
 
The companies in the cluster that are non-publicly listed are: Sime Darby 
Plantations, Sime Darby Property and Sime Darby Motors. Sime Darby Berhad, 
as a holding company, is at the top of the hierarchical structure for these four 
subsidiaries.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows that Sime Darby Berhad is a highly centralised firm as the 
hierarchical index is 92%. The higher hierarchical index means the companies 
have many layers of hierarchy in its structure. It makes the holding company 
highly centralised and heavy in manoeuvring the whole group in synergy. Sime 
Darby, which was founded in 1910 and is the largest plantation business group 
in Malaysia in terms of market capitalisation is a global player in the agribusiness 
sector. It operates in 26 countries through more than 500 subsidiaries through 
five sectors: plantation, motors, property development, industrial, energy and 
utilities. This explains the highly centralised and hierarchical structure of the 
company. The element of cross-shareholdings is not seen in the flagship. The 
shareholding is straightforward as can be seen in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3.  
 
 
Boustead Holdings Berhad 
 
Results in Table 4.2 shows that Boustead Holdings has 11 pyramid tiers, the 
highest among the GLCs. This could be due to its vast diversification of business 
activities across the economic sectors. The bottom most companies have to take 
86 
 
11 steps to reach the top holding company. The table shows a wide network 
coverage. Boustead’s companies have 4 levels of ownership compared with 
other companies, the highest among the GLCs. It shows a longer flow of 
decision-making. It has the second largest subsidiaries degree among all GLC 
companies, but still very much lower than Sime Darby. It reflects the lighter load 
of decision-making as the main holding group. Boustead has the largest 
shareholdings degree value, showing that the influence of shareholders in the 
decision-making may be higher. Boustead Holdings is 94% hierarchic, the 
highest hierarchical structure among GLCs. It also has the largest number of 
companies visualised in the network. Based on these features, Boustead has a 
heavy decision-making load as a diversified main holding company in various 
economic sectors. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Boustead network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
BOUSTEAD 11 4.00 93 44 94% 1350 
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Figure 4.3: Boustead Holdings shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.4: Boustead Holdings shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout 
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In Figure 4.3, it can be seen that most of the companies are spread throughout 
the network, forming many clusters. Boustead Holdings as the holding company 
owns majority shares in other public-listed companies, Pharmaniaga, Boustead 
Heavy Industries Corporations and Boustead Plantations. Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera (LTAT) holds 59% share in Boustead Holdings Berhad, the 
largest block shareholder among all GLCs studied in this thesis. It is evident that 
LTAT is the key player in terms of decision-making within this group. It started in 
1990, when LTAT held a majority interest in Boustead Holdings and Affin 
Holdings. In 2011, LTAT acquired, through Boustead, Malaysia’s largest 
integrated local healthcare company and generic pharmaceuticals manufacturer, 
Pharmaniaga. Almost all other companies in the LTAT group are private 
enterprises in a diverse range of sectors such as plantations, communications 
and biotechnology (Gomez et al., 2017).  
 
 
In 2013, Boustead held 21% ownership while LTAT held 35% of Affin Holdings 
Berhad. Affin Holdings is wholly owned by Affin Bank. Affin Holdings Berhad, 
one of the leading financial services provider, is a majority shareholder of Affin 
Bank group and owned a few other companies in various industries. Affin Bank, 
Affin Investment Bank Berhad, and AXA Affin General Insurance Berhad are the 
major subsidiaries of Affin Holdings which subsequently lead to the spread of 
clusters and sub-clusters in Boustead’s group network. 
 
 
This proves the existence of cross-shareholding within the LTAT–Boustead 
Holdings–Affin Holdings network. It shows that the decision-making process is 
crucial at LTAT and Boustead Holdings as they own a similar group of 
companies. While Boustead is not as huge as Sime Darby in terms of market 
capitalisation, through its ownership ties with LTAT, it is associated with Affin 
Holdings, a key player in the financial sector, making it an equally important 
corporate entity in Malaysia. 
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IJM Plantations Berhad 
 
Table 4.3 shows that IJM Plantations has eight tiers of the pyramid in its 
structure. It is relatively lower than Sime Darby and Boustead because IJM 
Plantations is a subsidiary of IJM Corporation. The companies within IJM 
Plantations have a 2.4 level of decision-making flow, larger than Sime Darby 
which has 1.4 level. The size of its subsidiaries is 79, very much less than Sime 
Darby, but not as much as Boustead. The shareholdings degree is 33, slightly 
higher than Sime Darby, showing the moderate influence of shareholders in the 
decision-making control. IJM Plantations is 84% hierarchic, which is not so high 
compared to the other GLCs with a similar size. It has 421 companies visualised 
in the network. Based on the topology metrics, IJM Plantations is reasonably 
proportionate compared to Sime Darby and Boustead. This could be due to its 
feature as the subsidiary of IJM Corporation, whilst both Sime Darby and 
Boustead are main holding companies. 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: IJM Plantations network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership 
tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
IJM Plantations 8 2.41 79 33 84% 421 
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Figure 4.5: IJM Plantations shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.6: IJM Plantations shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout 
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Referring to Figure 4.5, it can be seen IJM Plantations is majority owned by its 
holding company, IJM Corporations. IJM has an incredibly complex interlocking 
stock ownership pattern as this group has interests in three public-listed 
companies: IJM Corp, IJM Land and IJM Plantations. The major shareholder in 
IJM Corporations is PNB, whose stake is through the ASNB’s various trust fund 
schemes.  
 
 
IJM Corp owns Road Builder (M) Holdings, which then created a cluster within 
the network. IJM Plantations owns a majority stake in Industrial Concrete 
Products Bhd, IJM Construction Sdn Bhd and IJM Investments (M) Limited. 
Cross-shareholding can be seen at the subsidiaries level. 
 
 
IJM Corp is a substantial shareholder of IJM Plantations, with a 55.1 percent 
stake. The Sabah state government has a 4.62 percent stake in IJM Plantations 
through a private firm, Desa Plus Sdn Bhd. In 1985, IJM Plantations entered a 
project to develop estates in Sabah. Since then, its land bank in Sabah has 
increased, expanding to Indonesia. The company regards itself as a “boutique” 
oil palm agribusiness in Sabah. IJM Plantations was listed on the Bursa’s main 
board in July 2003. 
 
 
Kulim Berhad 
 
Results in Table 4.4 shows that Kulim has four layers in the pyramidal structure, 
the least among all GLCs in the plantations sector. Its companies have two levels 
of ownership of other companies, making it larger than Sime Darby. Its 
subsidiaries size is 20, the smallest among all GLCs. The shareholdings degree 
is 27, which shows the low influence of the shareholders. Kulim is 81% 
hierarchic, also the least among all GLCs. It has 101 companies visualised in the 
network. Based on the topology metrics, Kulim is smaller than the other three 
GLCs. Its structure shows the features of a lean structure, which could have an 
efficient flow of decision-making.  This could be due to its feature as a state-
owned GLC compared to the other three companies, which are owned by the 
federal government GLICs that have a higher amount of investments and higher 
social obligations. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Kulim network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
KULIM 
BERHAD 
4 1.96 20 27 81% 101 
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Figure 4.7: Kulim Berhad shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.8: Kulim Berhad shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout 
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Kulim is a majority owned (55%) company of Johor Corporation, a state-owned 
investment agency. Johor Corp’s ownership of Kulim was a result of a takeover. 
Figure 4.8 shows shareholdings ownership by Kulim. The ownership structure is 
smaller compared to three other plantations company, Sime Darby, Boustead 
and IJM Plantations. There are only two big business groups which are majority 
owned by Kulim. It wholly owns EPA Management, an investment holding 
providing management services and consultancy, and a mechanical equipment 
assembly company. Kulim owns Sindora Bhd with 77% share. Sindora’s 
business is in investment holding, and operations of oil palm and rubber estates. 
Kulim has a lean ownership structure, compared to the other government-owned 
plantations companies. 
 
 
4.1.2 Family-owned companies 
 
 
The network metrics results are presented in Tables 4.5 to 4.8. The discussion 
focuses on each of the family-owned companies.  
 
 
Kuala Lumpur-Kepong Berhad 
 
Referring to Table 4.5, KLK has 12 layers in its pyramidal structure, the largest 
among all FOBs. This could be due to their diversification in business and its 
main holding company, Batu Kawan Berhad. KLK’s companies have three levels 
of ownership of other companies, reflected in three levels of flows in the decision-
making process. Its subsidiaries size is 116, the largest among all the FOBs. The 
shareholdings degree is 43, the most among the FOBs. It indicates a high level 
of influence by the shareholders in decision-making. Despite having the most 
shareholdings degree, KLK is 81% hierarchic, the second least hierarchical 
among all the FOBs. It suggests that the size of the shareholdings degree does 
not reflect the decision-making control in KLK. It has 520 companies visualised 
in the network, the second largest among the FOBs.  
 
 
Based on the topology metrics, KLK is the largest among the other three FOBs. 
However, they have managed to keep their hierarchy level relatively low 
compared to other companies with similar size. It indicates that KLK’s decision-
making control is fairly distributed across the company’s network. The 
subsidiaries have some level of autonomy in business decision-making. 
 
 
Table 4.5: KL Kepong network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership 
tier 
Subsidiary 
degree  
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
KLK 12 3.06 116 43 81% 520 
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Figure 4.9: KL Kepong Berhad shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.10: KL Kepong Berhad shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout 
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Figure 4.9 shows that KLK Berhad’s ownership structure has an indirect link to 
the ultimate owner, Batu Kawan Bhd and Arusha Enterprise. Batu Kawan is an 
investment holding company with the majority of its investments in chemical 
manufacturing, transportation, property development and plantations. Arusha 
Enterprise is also an investment company.  
 
 
KLK Bhd owns two large business groups, KL Kepong International Ltd and 
Quarry Lane Sdn Bhd. KL Kepong International Ltd owns Synthomer PLC with 
11% while KLK Bhd owns 8%, making it the biggest block shareholder in 
Synthomer group besides directors’ interests. Synthomer is formerly known as 
Yule & Catto and Co., a British-based chemical business. They are the world’s 
dominant supplier of lattices and specialty emulsion polymers in coatings, 
construction, textiles, paper, and synthetic gloves segment. Quarry Lane Sdn 
Bhd is wholly owned by KLK. These two subsidiaries formed an extensive 
network of clusters within the KL Kepong network. 
 
 
Batu Kawan has eight subsidiaries. KL Kepong Bhd is its biggest subsidiary. 
Batu Kawan is owned by Arusha Enterprise which is in turn owned by Wan Hin 
Investments Sdn Bhd, as seen in Figure 3.6 in Chapter 3. Wan Hin Investments 
is jointly owned by Diyi Sdn Bhd (40%) and High Quest Holdings Sdn Bhd (40%). 
High Quest is majority owned by Cubic Crystal Corporation (86%). Cubic Crystal 
Corporation is wholly owned by Lee Oi Hian. Lee Oi Hian and Lee Hau Hian 
have minority shares in Wan Hin Investments. Cubic Crytal is wholly owned by 
Grateful Blessings Inc, an investment holding company incorporated in the 
British Virgin Islands. Grateful Blessings is wholly owned by Lee Oi Hian. 
 
 
IOI Corporations Berhad 
 
IOI Corp has 11 layers in its pyramidal structure, the second largest among the 
FOBs (Table 4.6). It is assumed that for every strategic decision made, it needs 
to go down to 11 levels in the structure to reach to the bottom. IOI Corp has the 
most levels of ownership compared to other companies. It suggests that every 
company within IOI Corp has three levels of flow in the decision-making. It has 
74 subsidiaries, relatively smaller than KLK which is more pyramidal and has 
more number of companies. The shareholdings size is 36, smaller than KLK and 
Genting Plantations. It shows moderate influence in decision-making by the top 
shareholders. However, IOI Corp is 93% hierarchic, the highest among the 
FOBs. It is proposed that IOI Corp’s decision-making control is more centralised 
than KLK. Both IOI Corp and KLK have a similar number of companies, but the 
respective hierarchy levels varies. IOI Corp has 639 companies visualised in the 
network, making it the largest FOB in this research. 
 
 
Table 4.6: IOI Corporation network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
IOI 11 3.32 74 36 93% 639 
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Figure 4.11: IOI Corporations Berhad shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.12: IOI Corporations Berhad shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout 
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Figure 4.11 shows that Vertical Capacity Sdn Bhd is the majority shareholder in 
IOI Corporation. Lee Shin Cheng is the founder of IOI Corporation and owns 
Progressive Holdings Sdn Bhd which owns Vertical Capacity Sdn Bhd. Lee Shin 
Cheng’s ownership of Progressive Holdings Sdn Bhd gives him high control in 
IOI Corporations’ business decision-making. 
 
 
Four principal subsidiaries extend from the clusters and sub-clusters in the 
network. They are: IOI Properties Group Bhd, Loders Croklaan Group, IOI 
Oleochemicals Industries Bhd, and Oleander Capital Resources Pte Ltd.  
 
 
IOI Properties Group Berhad is one of Malaysia’s leading public-listed property 
developers. It has built a solid reputation as the esteemed property arm of IOI 
Group before its successful listing on the Main Board of the Malaysian Stock 
Exchange on 15 January 2014. Today, IOI Properties Group Berhad is renowned 
as one of the largest property companies in the country with a proven track 
record spanning more than three decades in the property development industry. 
Its principal activities include property development, property investment, leisure 
and hospitality. It has successfully developed sustainable townships in sought-
after regions of the Klang Valley and Johor in Malaysia while embarking on 
property developments in Singapore and the People’s Republic of China. The 
company currently has a total of 10,000 acres of land bank in Malaysia and 
abroad. 
 
 
Another subsidiary, Loders Croklaan Group, currently known as IOI Loders 
Croklaan, is the leading producer of premium quality oils and fats. The 
company’s journey began in the 1800s with two distinct companies: the Dutch 
Crok & Laan and the British Loders & Nucoline, both successful in vegetable oils 
and fats. Unilever acquired Crok & Laan in 1970 and merged it with its subsidiary 
Loders & Nucoline, and Loders Croklaan was established. In 2002, the company 
was sold to the Malaysian IOI Group, which is active in palm oil plantations, 
oleochemicals, real estate development, and downstream manufacturing. 
 
 
Today, IOI Loders Croklaan focuses on palm oil lipid solutions and is renowned 
for technological breakthroughs. With various state-of-the-art processes such as 
fractionation, interesterification, emulsification, IOI Loders Croklaan is well 
positioned to deliver a unique functionality and value to the end product. In 2010 
they opened a state-of-the-art refinery in Rotterdam, which is the world’s first 
large-scale refinery that uses the process of enzymatic interesterification. IOI 
Corp has divested 70% of its shares in Loaders Croklaan to Bunge Ltd in 
September 2017 (Hanim, 2017). It indicates that IOI Corp’s structure would have 
had a lighter decision-making load due to the significant amount of divestment. 
 
 
IOI Oleo Chemicals Industries Bhd started from zero-base in 1980. The humble 
but bold initiative was pioneering the palm-based oleochemical industry in the 
world. With the inception of their inaugural manufacturing facility, they were then 
the first and only oleochemical plant that produces palm-based oleochemicals 
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exclusively. Today, the Oleochemical Division of IOI Corporation is the leading 
producer of vegetable oil-based fatty acids. Its production capacity per annum is 
approximately 710,000MT. The manufacturing facilities are suitably located in 
Prai and Pasir Gudang. 
 
 
The fourth and last subsidiary, Oleander Capital Resources Pte Ltd is a foreign 
private investment holding company. It owns PT Berkat Agro Sawit Indo, an 
associate company under Bumitama Agri Ltd. Bumitama Agri Ltd is a public-
listed company and the leading palm oil producer in Indonesia. 
 
 
Genting Plantations Berhad 
 
Table 4.7 shows that Genting Plantations has nine layers in the pyramidal 
structure. It has one level of ownership, among the smallest in the FOBs. Its 
subsidiaries size is 77, relatively small compared to KLK and IOI Corp. This could 
be due to its sole focus on plantation related businesses, as the other business 
sectors are under the main holding group, Genting Berhad. The shareholdings 
size is 38, slightly less than IOI Corp. It suggests the shareholdings degree 
showed that the invested capital in this company is high and it may affect the 
influence in the decision-making. Given its smaller size of subsidiaries, Genting 
Plantations is 90% hierarchic, higher than KLK the largest pyramid, in terms of 
subsidiaries and shareholdings degree. It reflects that the decision-making 
control is centralised at the Genting Plantations group. It has 483 companies 
visualised in the network. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Genting Plantations network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
GENTING 9 1.03 77 41 90% 483 
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Figure 4.13. Genting Plantations shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.14. Genting Plantations shareholdings ownership using hierarchical layout 
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Figure 4.13 shows that Genting Plantations is owned by Genting Berhad which 
is owned by Kien Huat Realty Sdn Bhd which is in turn owned by Parkview 
Management Sdn Bhd. Lim Goh Tong’s family owns Parkview Management. 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), a statutory body that acts as a government 
investment company also has a 16% share in Genting Plantations. 
 
 
While the oil palm plantation business remains the core activity of Genting 
Plantations, the Company has diversified into property development to unlock 
the value of its strategically-located land bank through its wholly-owned 
subsidiary Genting Property Sdn Bhd. 
 
 
Genting Berhad’s major subsidiaries are Genting Plantations, Genting UK PLC, 
Genting Singapore PLC, and Genting Casinos UK Limited.  
 
 
Genting UK PLC operates a network of casinos in England and Scotland. It also 
operates an online casino and poker room that offers various casino games. 
Genting UK PLC was formerly known as Genting Stanley PLC and changed its 
name in March 2009. The company was incorporated in 1980 and is based in 
Birmingham, United Kingdom.  
 
 
Genting Singapore Plc was incorporated in 1984 in the Isle of Man. Genting 
Singapore was converted into a public limited company on 20 March 1987 and 
listed on the Main Board of the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited 
on 12 December 2005. For over 30 years, Genting Singapore and its subsidiaries 
have been at the forefront of gaming and integrated resort development in 
Australia, the Bahamas, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the United 
Kingdom. Today, they are best known for the award-winning flagship 
project, Resorts World™ Sentosa in Singapore, which is one of the largest fully 
integrated destination resorts in South East Asia.  
 
 
Genting Casinos UK Ltd is majority owned by Genting Berhad. Genting UK is 
one of the leading casino operators in the UK, with its ownership of 41 of the 
total 143 operating casinos as at 31 December 2013. In London, Genting UK 
operates a total of six casinos following the reopening of Genting Casino 
Chinatown in the heart of the City’s West End in March 2013. Genting UK’s 
competitive position in the London casino market is strong, led by its great 
heritage and flagship offerings which capitalise on its four prestigious brands in 
the capital city. Outside London, Genting UK continued its investment in 
improving its provincial properties with significant refurbishments having taken 
place at Stoke, Liverpool, Luton, Salford, Edgbaston, Nottingham and Glasgow. 
This leads to extensive clusters formation in the network. 
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Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad 
 
Referring to Table 4.8, Jaya Tiasa has five layers in its pyramid, the lowest 
among the FOBs. It has one level of ownership in another company, among the 
smallest in FOBs. Its subsidiaries size is 28. This could be due to its sole focus 
on timber and oil palm plantation related business, apart from its main holding 
group of Rimbunan Hijau. The shareholder's size is 27, which suggests that the 
company operates in a small circle of the network but with a large number of 
shareholders. Jaya Tiasa is 75% hierarchic, the lowest among FOBs. It suggests 
that the decision-making control is decentralised, where the subsidiaries are 
autonomous.  It has 81 companies visualised in the network. 
 
 
Table 4.8. Jaya Tiasa network topology metrics 
Network 
metrics/ 
Company 
Network 
diameter 
Average 
ownership tier 
Subsidiary 
degree 
Shareholdings 
degree 
Hierarchical 
index 
No. of 
nodes 
JAYA TIASA 5 1.07 28 33 75% 81 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Jaya Tiasa shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse 
network layout 
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Figure 4.16: Jaya Tiasa shareholdings ownership using hierarchical 
layout 
 
 
 In Figure 4.15, the links to the major shareholders are clear. The company is 
majority-owned by Tiong Toh Siong Holdings with 22%. The other two major 
shareholders are Genine Chain Limited with 18% and Double Universal Limited 
with 15% through Amanas Sdn Bhd, Nustinas Sdn Bhd, and Insan Anggun Sdn 
Bhd. Genine Chain Limited and Double Universal Limited were incorporated in 
1992 as private company limited by shares registered in Hong Kong.  
 
 
4.2 GLCs AND FOBs SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
 
Comparison of the GLCs network topology metrics is shown in Table 4.9. Results 
in the table reflect in some ways the results in Figures 4.17 and 4.18.  Referring 
to Figure 4.17, Sime Darby is the biggest group among all GLCs in the network, 
followed by Boustead, and IJM. But, the network diameter in Table 4.9 shows 
Boustead has the largest pyramid tiers. Although Sime Darby is big, but it’s not 
reflected in its pyramidal tiers. IJM Plantations is not as big as Sime Darby in 
Figure 4.17, but results in Table 4.9 shows a similarity in terms of pyramidal tiers. 
The size of the subsidiaries degree defines the size of Sime Darby as shown in 
Figure 4.17. Given the smallest average ownership tier and largest subsidiaries 
degree among all GLCs, Sime Darby’s structure can be seen as very centralised. 
The highly centralised structure indicates the decision-making load may be 
heavy at the top of the pyramid.  
 
 
It is clear that, within GLCs, there are variations of share ownership structure. 
Kulim has the lowest value for all of the network metrics. It reflects its size of 
business operation. This may be due to its ownership through the state-owned 
investment company, compared to Sime Darby, Boustead, and IJM Plantations 
which are owned by the federal GLICs. The amount of investment for the federal 
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GLICs is more than the state GLIC. In terms of decision-making process, the 
state-owned investment company has a shorter process, as indicated by Kulim’s 
pyramidal tier and hierarchical index.  
 
 
The GLCs are linked via GLICs, such as PNB, EPF, LTAT, and Kumpula Wang 
Persaraan (KWAP). The GLICs have a stake in the four plantation companies. 
However, the percentage of their shares are small, except for PNB and LTAT. 
The small percentage of shareholdings suggests that its motive is to focus on 
the return on investment, instead of controlling the business’s decision-making. 
PNB is the major shareholder for Sime Darby and IJM Plantation, which are the 
big players in oil palm plantation.  
 
 
The links via GLICs show the agribusiness corporations are heavily financialised 
by the financial institutions. This could shift their strategies in the decision-
making for sustainable development. 
 
 
Figure 4.18 shows the ownership structure in a hierarchic layout for all four 
GLCs. Boustead and Sime Darby stand at the second and third level from the 
top of the hierarchy. IJM Plantations and Kulim are situated at the fifth level of 
the hierarchy. This indicates that Sime Darby and Boustead are higher than 
Kulim and IJM Plantations in the GLCs’ hierarchical structure. It also shows their 
differences in terms of business scales even though all of them are owned by 
the government. Given the advantage of big businesses, Sime Darby and 
Boustead are leading the GLCs in the plantation sector. Their decisions have 
significant impacts on the industry as well as to the other firms in the sector. Sime 
Darby and Boustead share a similar hierarchical index, but their average 
ownership tier is different. It proves that, although the organisation is hierarchical, 
the design of the ownership structure plays an important role too. Li and Wu 
(2010) agreed that ownership structure determines performance and future 
growth of the company. The structure plays the role as a corporate governance 
mechanism. Thus, the size of the corporation and composition of shareholdings 
are important for achieving good corporate governance. 
 
 
Table 4.9: GLCs network topology metrics 
Type of ownership GLC 
Network metrics/Company SIME BOUSTEAD IJM KULIM 
Network diameter 9 11 8 4 
Average ownership tier 1.44 4.00 2.41 1.96 
Subsidiaries degree  499 93 79 20 
Shareholdings degree  29 44 33 27 
Hierarchical index 92% 94% 84% 81% 
Number of nodes 736 1350 421 101 
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Figure 4.17. Government-linked companies (GLCs) shareholdings ownership topology using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.18. Government-linked companies (GLCs) shareholdings ownership structure using hierarchical layout 
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Table 4.10 compares the network topology metrics among family-owned 
businesses. KLK has the highest pyramidal tiers among all FOBs. This could be 
due to its owner, Batu Kawan – a significant corporate entity in the plantations 
sector – beinghighly involved in KLK’s business operations, thus contributing to 
the pyramid tiers. However, the hierarchical index is smaller than IOI and Genting 
Plantations. IOI Corporations and KLK are very much similar except for the 
hierarchy index. Genting Plantations and Jaya Tiasa has a similarity in terms of 
the average ownership tier. Jaya Tiasa has the lowest value for all its network 
metrics. It shows the scale of its business operations, as it has the least land 
bank area compared to the other FOBs. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 demonstrates the ownership structure for the family-owned 
plantation companies. The companies’ sizes are similar except for Jaya Tiasa, 
the smallest among them. Although they are owned by different families, they 
are linked to similar financial investment institutions, such as PNB, Dimensional 
Fund Advisors, Public Bank, Eaton Vance Corp, and others. The shareholdings 
percentage of these financial investment institutions are small and suggests less 
control than the family owner. However, it indicates that the family-owned 
businesses are going through similar financialisation as the government-owned 
businesses.  
 
 
The family-owned structure topology is relatively smaller than the government-
owned topology. This is due to the size of companies and the fact that family-
owned firms are smaller than government-owned firms. Although the business 
activities are similar for both family-owned and government-owned, family-
owned companies are less hierarchical. 
 
 
Figure 4.20 illustrates the hierarchical structure of the family-owned companies. 
IOI Corp, KLK, and Jaya Tiasa are at the same level in the hierarchy. Since 
Genting Plantations is owned by Genting Berhad, it is situated at one level lower 
in the hierarchy. Based on the figure, it is clear that the family-owned companies 
have cross-shareholdings at the top level of the hierarchy. This is not the case 
in the previous Figure 4.18 for the GLCs. 
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Table 4.10: FOBs network topology metrics 
Type of ownership Family-owned 
Network metrics/Company KLK IOI GENTING 
JAYA 
TIASA 
Network diameter 12 11 9 5 
Average ownership tier 3.06 3.32 1.03 1.07 
Subsidiaries degree 116 74 77 28 
Shareholdings degree 43 36 41 33 
Hierarchical index 81% 93% 90% 75% 
Number of nodes 520 639 483 81 
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Figure 4.19. Family-owned companies shareholdings ownership structure using prefuse network layout 
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Figure 4.20. Family-owned companies shareholdings ownership structure using hierarchical layout 
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4.3 Agribusiness and Plantation Sector Share Ownership Structure 
 
 
Table 4.11 concludes the features of both GLCs and FOBs in agribusiness and 
the plantation sector. The largest pyramid structure belongs to KLK, followed by 
IOI Corp and Boustead. Both KLK and IOI Corp are FOBs, whilst Boustead is a 
GLC. Kulim, a GLC and Jaya Tiasa, an FOB, have the smallest pyramid 
structure. The largest ownership tier is with Boustead (GLC) followed by IOI Corp 
(FOB) whilst Genting Plantations and Jaya Tiasa have the smallest ownership 
tier among all companies.  
 
 
Sime Darby has the biggest subsidiaries size, followed by Boustead. The 
smallest subsidiaries size on the other hand, is seen with Kulim. Kulim has the 
smallest number of shareholders. Boustead has the largest shareholders, 
followed by KLK. The most hierarchical company amongst the GLCs and FOBs 
in the plantation sector is Boustead, followed by IOI Corp. The least hierarchical 
business group is Jaya Tiasa. Boustead also has the most number of companies 
in the structure presented in this research, followed by Sime Darby. 
 
 
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that the ownership identity (GLC 
or FOB) did not shape the company’s structure topology, at least in the plantation 
sector in Malaysia. Both GLCs and FOBs have their own characteristics in 
forming their corporate structure. This can be derived from its history of 
establishments and series of transformations as a result of political histories and 
economic development (Roe, 1993). 
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Table 4.11: Network topology metrics for major plantations companies 
 
GLC Family-owned 
Network metrics/Company BOUS SIME IJM KULIM GENT IOI KLK JT 
Network diameter 11 9 8 4 9 11 12 5 
Average ownership tier 4.00 1.44 2.41 1.96 1.03 3.32 3.06 1.07 
Subsidiaries degree  93 499 79 20 77 74 116 28 
Shareholdings degree  44 29 33 27 41 36 43 33 
Hierarchical index 94% 92% 84% 81% 90% 93% 81% 75% 
Number of nodes 1350 736 421 101 483 639 520 81 
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Shareholdings ownership topology for the eight major plantation companies is 
shown in Figure 4.21. Even though they are owned through different patterns of 
owners, all of them are linked and connected to each other to a certain degree. 
Four of the companies, IOI Corp, KL Kepong, Genting Plantations, and IJM 
Plantations are close to each other at the core of the network. Sime Darby and 
Boustead are at the periphery of the network. Jaya Tiasa and Kulim are at the 
circumference of the core. The shareholdings at the network core are mostly at 
a minimal percentage, except for the major shareholders for GLCs. 
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Figure 4.21. Shareholdings ownership topology for palm oil GLCs and family-owned corporations using prefuse network 
layout 
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The zoomed-in figure (Figure 4.22) is to illustrate the centre of the topology and 
the links that link all the eight corporations. There are three types of shareholders 
in the figure below. The blue nodes indicate GLICs; the pink nodes indicate 
private financial investment institutions and the purple nodes are the family-
owned firms.  
 
 
The shareholdings topology are similar for both GLCs and family-owned 
businesses. They are all financialised by financial investment institutions. 
However, the degree of the financialisation differs from each other. GLCs’ major 
shareholders are linked to most of the other companies, including the family-
owned firms. In contrast to that, the family-owned firms’ major shareholders are 
not linked to any other companies. GLCs’ shareholders are mainly the 
investment houses which focus on building the nation’s wealth. They have the 
ability and the capacity to invest widely in other companies to maximise their 
returns. On the other hand, family-owned firms’ shareholders are mainly 
independent investing institutions, which have limitations in investing at a bigger 
scale. They tend to focus on creating and circulating their wealth internally within 
their holdings group. 
 
 
121 
 
 
Figure 4.22. Zoomed-in of the shareholdings ownership topology for palm oil GLCs and FOBs 
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Figure 4.23 shows the hierarchical layout of the major oil palm companies. There 
five companies: Sime Darby, Boustead, IOI Corp, KLK and Jaya Tiasa situated 
at the fourth level of the hierarchy. Three other companies, IJM Plantations, 
Kulim, and Genting Plantations are at the mid-level of the hierarchy. This could 
be due to their main holdings company as the major shareholders. There are 
many cross-linkages among the top level in the hierarchy involving family-owned 
companies. It is evident that there are various proportions of the hierarchical 
structure for all companies. These variations lead to their decision-making 
behaviours. This will be uncovered and discussed in the next chapter. 
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Figure 4.23: Ownership hierarchy structure of the major oil palm plantations companies 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
 
STRUCTURAL CONTROL AGAINST DECISIONS LOAD 
 
 
This research further analyses the shareholdings data to develop an advanced 
understanding of the corporations’ control of decision-making. With the help of 
network analysis, the shareholdings data produced fascinating results that lifts 
the understanding of the business groups’ ownership and control structure to a 
new level. The advanced network centralities are the core feature of network 
analysis, and the results are presented in this chapter. 
 
 
In chapter three, two core centralities metrics were highlighted, betweenness 
and stress. Betweenness indicates the structural control and stress indicates the 
decisions’ load. These metrics provide the insights to compare the control and 
the load of decision-making between the eight companies. The comparison is to 
analyse how the company’s ownership structure influences their decision-
making behaviour. The analysis qualified the company’s structure and gives 
deeper insights in understanding their decision-making behaviour individually 
and as a group – GLC and FOB.  
 
 
At the end of this chapter, the findings shows the model that explains the 
government-owned and family-owned company’s ownership structure and 
decision-making control in the plantation sector. This model can be replicated to 
another scope of study and to a different dataset to test its suitability and 
diversity. 
 
 
5.1 Network Centralities Metrics 
 
 
5.1.1 Structural Control 
 
 
Network analysis produced betweenness centrality metric for the eight 
companies. The study compared their means using a t-test. The test determines 
whether there is a statistical significant difference between the means in the 
separate GLC and FOB groups. In terms of this research, the t-test is to see 
whether the structural control of the eight companies is different or similar to 
each other. 
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Table 5.1: Structural control t-test mean values comparison  
S
tr
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tu
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e
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Structural control (p-value) 
GLC Family-owned 
Boustead 
Sime 
Darby 
IJM Kulim IOI Corp KLK Genting 
Jaya 
Tiasa 
G
L
C
 
Boustead 1.000        
Sime Darby 0.587 1.000       
IJM 0.000* 0.000* 1.000      
Kulim 0.000* 0.000* 0.002* 1.000     
F
a
m
il
y
-o
w
n
e
d
 IOI Corp 0.000* 0.434 0.000* 0.000* 1.000    
KLK 0.027* 0.222 0.000* 0.000* 0.560 1.000   
Genting 0.000* 0.013* 0.005* 0.000* 0.428 0.252 1.000  
Jaya Tiasa 0.000* 0.000* 0.017* 0.665 0.020* 0.000* 0.000* 1.000 
Note: * p-value significant at 0.005. 
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The mean value comparison of structural control shows some significant 
patterns based on the p-value produced from the t-test (see Table 5.1). The 
results show the GLCs’ and FOBs’ structural control have similarities as well as 
differences. Between GLCs and FOBs, a mixed pattern has appeared. Not all 
GLCs’ structural control are significantly different from FOBs. Within the GLCs, 
the structural control for Boustead and Sime Darby were significantly different 
than IJM and Kulim. Kulim’s structural control was similar to Jaya Tiasa, but not 
the other GLCs. Boustead and Sime Darby have a similar structural control. For 
example, Sime Darby’s structural control is similar to IOI Corp and KLK; both are 
FOBs and Boustead, a GLC. The internal control in the company’s structure is 
similar for Sime Darby, IOI Corp, KLK, and Boustead. The control of the decision-
making within the same tier in the company’s hierarchy is similar for these 
companies.  
 
 
The similarity between Sime Darby and Boustead could be due to the similar 
history of the establishment; both were initially a foreign-owned company and 
have close links with their major shareholders, PNB and LTAT, the major and 
influential GLICs respectively. Additionally, the structural control is similar for 
companies that have similar sizes in the similar sector; regardless whether they 
are government-owned or family-owned. 
 
 
Based on the result in Table 5.1, IJM Plantations’ structural control was 
significantly different with the other GLCs and all FOBs. IJM Corp, the main 
holding company is a federal government-linked company which was formed 
through a joint venture with a local firm. There is every likelihood that the main 
group has high control over the subsidiaries decision-making process. Unlike the 
other GLCs, IJM Corp is the only federal state-owned company (among Sime 
Darby, Boustead, and Kulim) which initially was not a GLC. The control through 
the hierarchy structure is potentially embedded in the history of a company’s 
establishment.  
Kulim’s structural control is significantly different from other GLCs too. Being the 
only state-government owned company in this research could be the reason 
explaining the difference. Apart from who owns the companies, the federal 
government or the state government, the design of the ownership structure is 
crucial. The management team and the monitoring board of directors play an 
important role in complementing the effectiveness of the corporate structure 
design.  
 
 
As for the FOBs, a mixed pattern has appeared. Within the family-owned 
companies group, their structural controls have some similarities and 
differences.  KLK’s, IOI Corp’s, and Genting Plantations’ structural control are 
similar. They are well established and well known family-owned conglomerates. 
KLK and Genting are led by the second generation of the founder’s family. KLK 
and IOI Corporation are involved in similar businesses that justify their similarity 
in structural control. Jaya Tiasa’s structural control is different from the other 
family-owned companies. Based on this analysis, their shareholdings structure 
is different from the other family-owned companies. Their shareholdings are not 
as dispersed as the other family-owned companies. Jaya Tiasa’s structural 
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control is similar to a state-government linked company, Kulim. Kulim also has a 
concentrated shareholdings structure. 
 
 
Each company has its ownership structure design prior to their establishment 
history. Structural control is rooted in the hierarchy as they grow and become 
embedded in the ownership structure design. This could be the reason for their 
commonalities and differences. 
 
 
5.1.2 Decision’s load 
 
 
We compare the mean values of decisions’ load; it showed no distinct pattern. 
Most of the means were not significantly different from each other. For GLCs, 
Boustead’s, Sime Darby’s and IJM Plantations’ decisions load appear more 
significantly different than a few other companies. For example, Boustead is 
significantly different with all companies except IJM Plantations. Sime Darby is 
significantly different to Boustead and IJM Plantations but similar with all other 
companies.  
 
This suggests that within Boustead’s and IJM Plantations’ hierarchy structure, 
the amount of decisions that is fed to the structure are similar. Within the GLCs, 
Boustead’s decisions load in the structure is different than Sime Darby and 
Kulim. The difference between Boustead and Kulim could be justified by their 
different company’s size. Sime Darby’s management is run by professionals who 
have experience in their respective business activities, however, this is not the 
case for Boustead. Boustead’s management team are not all professionals in 
their respective business division. Having professionals as the decision maker 
could lead to differences in the decisions load within the structure.  
 
 
Within FOBs, all of the companies showed a similar decisions load in their 
structure. Boustead is the only GLC that has a different decisions’ load with the 
FOBs. It showed that among the family-owned companies, their decisions’ load 
is similar although their corporate structures are different. Some of the GLCs 
have different decisions’ load than the others. This suggests that the GLCs and 
FOBs decisions load could not significantly be explained by their shareholdings 
structure. 
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Table 5.2: Decisions load t-test mean values comparison 
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Decisions load  (p value) 
GLC Family-owned 
Boustead 
Sime 
Darby 
IJM Kulim IOI Corp KLK Genting 
Jaya 
Tiasa 
G
L
C
 
Boustead 1.000        
Sime Darby 0.000* 1.000       
IJM 0.412 0.025* 1.000      
Kulim 0.013* 0.694 0.069 1.000     
F
a
m
il
y
-o
w
n
e
d
 IOI Corp 0.000* 0.473 0.066 0.405 1.000    
KLK 0.000* 0.327 0.003* 0.796 0.072 1.000   
Genting 0.004* 0.613 0.125 0.515 0.938 0.176 1.000  
Jaya Tiasa 0.010* 0.482 0.052 0.718 0.271 0.949 0.379 1.000 
Note: * p-value significant at 0.005. 
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Comparison of the decisions load seems to be of little help to understanding the 
decision-making behaviour among these corporations. This research regressed 
structural control and decisions load to provide a holistic insight in deciphering 
GLCs and FOBs decision-making behaviour. 
 
 
5.1.3 Structural Control Against Decisions Load 
 
 
This research visualises both metrics in a network visual. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
the bigger picture of structural control against decisions load for the eight 
agribusiness companies involved in this research. 
 
 
The nodes represent a company in the eight companies’ shareholdings 
structure. The node’s size signify the amount of structural control. The bigger the 
nodes, the higher the structural control. The nodes’ colour, red to green shades 
show high to low range of decisions load, red colour nodes have the highest 
decisions load, and green colour nodes indicate low decisions load.  
 
 
Boustead and Affin Holdings have the highest structural control and decisions 
load (Table 5.3). This is due to their extensive shareholdings in other companies 
because Affin Holdings is the financial investment institution, and the 
shareholdings are across the entire economic sector. IJM Corporation has higher 
structural control and decisions load because it has extensive shareholdings due 
to its diversified business activities.  
 
 
Boustead and Affin, IJM Corporation and IJM Plantations, and Genting Berhad 
and Genting Plantations are in the same business groups respectively. Boustead 
Holdings, IJM Corporations and Genting Berhad are the main holding companies 
in each group, whereas Affin Holdings, IJM Plantations and Genting Plantations 
are the major subsidiaries of the respective main holding company. The metrics 
for decisions load of the top three companies (Boustead, Affin and IJM 
Corporation) in Table 5.3 shows a big gap with the bottom seven companies. 
Decisions load is calculated based on the number of the shortest path across 
each company’s network respectively; it shows that these three companies have 
a higher number of shortest paths than the others. The higher number of shortest 
paths indicates that the company has a higher number of links in connecting 
them to the neighbours. Boustead and Affin has the most heavy decisions load 
among the major plantation companies. This could be related to its extensive 
shareholdings in the financial institutions. Since the shareholding represents the 
links between companies, it translates into the decisions load via the 
shareholding links. 
 
 
 
 
 
130 
 
Table 5.3: Structural control and decisions load index for major oil palm 
plantations companies 
Ranking (highest 
to lowest 
decisions load) 
Company 
Decisions load 
index 
Structural control 
index 
1 Boustead 126842 0.0093 
2 Affin Holdings 119966 0.0088 
3 
Kuala Lumpur 
Kepong 
60711 0.0045 
4 IJM Corporation 51508 0.0032 
7 IJM Plantations 42365 0.003 
8 IOI Corporations 32523 0.0025 
12 Sime Darby 24243 0.0018 
13 Genting Berhad 19693 0.0018 
21 Kulim Malaysia 8968 7.65 E-4 
85 Jaya Tiasa 1710 1.4 E-4 
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Figure 5.1: Structural control and decisions load for major oil palm 
plantations 
 
5.2 Identifying Model 
 
 
The structural control and decisions load indexes were then converted to log 
values to improve the statistical interpretability. Based on the result, we run a 
simple linear regression to investigate the type of relationship that structural 
control and decisions load have. 
 
 
5.2.1 Local Model 
 
 
The study ran a simple linear regression using the following model: 
 
Structural control (C) = function of structural load (S)  (5.1) 
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As this is classified as the local model, there are eight individual models for 
each corporation which can also be written as: 
 
Ccorp=f(Sicorp, acorp, bcorp)  (5.2) 
 
Ccorp = a + b (Sicorp)  (5.3) 
 
where, 
 
Cicorp  =  Structural control of an agribusiness corporation 
acorp   =  slope for agribusiness corporation 
bcorp   =  intercept for agribusiness corporation 
Sicorp    =  Structural load of an agribusiness corporation 
i        =  a subsidiary/shareholdings unit 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Decision-making behaviour for major palm oil corporations 
using a local model 
 
 
This model was fit into each corporation’s dataset. This model is a local model 
with eight separate values of a (slope) and b (intercept) for each palm oil 
corporation. We regard a and b as “local parameters”. Based on this model, the 
slopes were compared to check for further similarities and differences. 
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Table 5.4: Regression results for the corporations (local model) 
 Intercept SE Intercept Slope SE Slope df N SD Intercept SD Slope r2 
Boustead -14.587 0.040 1.003 0.006 197 199 0.568 0.090 0.992 
Sime Darby -13.273 0.039 1.004 0.008 55 57 0.296 0.057 0.997 
IOI -13.049 0.073 1.008 0.013 92 94 0.703 0.127 0.985 
KLK -12.407 0.063 0.967 0.012 66 68 0.517 0.010 0.990 
Genting -12.433 0.053 1.006 0.010 49 51 0.378 0.071 0.995 
IJM -12.407 0.060 1.039 0.010 48 50 0.422 0.069 0.996 
Kulim -9.280 0.000 1.000 0.000 12 14 0 0 1 
Jaya Tiasa -9.994 0.480 1.127 0.099 9 11 1.591 0.329 0.935 
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Table 5.4 shows the regression results using a local model. The fitness of the 
model ranges from 93.5% (Jaya Tiasa) to 100% (Kulim), which means the model 
is good in explaining each corporation’s structural control against the decisions 
load. It could be a good proxy to estimate the company’s decision-making 
behaviour. With slope values ranging from 0.97 to 1.13, it is suggested that the 
regression lines are parallel.  
 
135 
 
Table 5.5: Slopes comparison for agribusiness corporations’ regression lines 
Slope (p-value) 
S
lo
p
e
 (
p
-v
a
lu
e
) 
 Boustead Sime Darby IOI Corp KLK Genting IJM Kulim Jaya Tiasa 
Boustead 1.000        
Sime Darby 0.903 1.000       
IOI Corp 0.741 0.005* 1.000      
KLK 0.001* 0.010* 0.023* 1.000     
Genting 0.794 0.880 0.918 0.014* 1.000    
IJM 0.002* 0.006* 0.058 0.000* 0.020* 1.000   
Kulim 0.650 0.589 0.556 0.008* 0.008* 0.000* 1.000  
Jaya Tiasa 0.215 0.222 0.237 0.114 0.231 0.382 0.214 1.000 
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Based on the regression results in Table 5.4, the slopes are compared. Referring 
to Table 5.5, a comparison of the slopes shows no clear pattern. There is no 
discernible pattern to provide further information on the decision-making 
behaviour according to the slopes.  
 
 
From the local model results, it is found that most of the slope values are close 
to 1 (Table 5.4). It indicates that all companies potentially have one similar 
behaviour. To confirm this, we compare a set of the previous regression model 
(local model) to a regression with all slopes at the value of 1 (global model).  
 
 
5.2.2 Global Model 
 
 
Based on the results of the local model, a simple linear regression for the global 
model was run. A global model means there is one model to represent the 
decision-making behaviour through structural control and decisions load 
relationship for all corporations. To provide a unifying theory, it was decided to 
have only one value of the slope, a, for all corporations and having eight values 
of intercepts, b. The global model is as follows: 
 
Cicorp = f(Sicorp, a global, b local)  (5.4) 
 
where, 
 
Cicorp   =  structural control of agribusiness corporations 
a       =  slope of the eight agribusiness corporation 
bcorp   =  intercept of an agribusiness corporation 
Sicorp  =  structural load of agribusiness corporations 
i      =  a subsidiary/shareholdings unit 
 
 
This research employs the global model because it can represent all 
corporations with a single regression model. The slope, a, at the value of 1 is the 
controlled parameter. It indicates that there is a single-alike behaviour for all 
companies in explaining their decision-making behaviour.  
 
 
The relationship between structural control and decisions load is linear. The 
corporation’s regression formed parallel lines in both graphs (Figures 5.2 and 
5.3), along with a gradient perpendicular to these lines. This gradient shows the 
spread of the eight corporations.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 shows regression lines for all corporations with slope values equal to 
1. When structural control increases, the decisions load increases accordingly. 
The data point at the peak of the regression line belongs to the main holding 
corporation, the highest point in structural control and decisions load. The 
subsidiaries’ points spread at the lower end of the regression line. The graph 
shows that the higher the structural control, the higher the decisions load. This 
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is reflective of the fact that the higher the company in the hierarchy, the more 
decisions they have to make, mainly the strategic and long-term decisions. So, 
the burden or the decisions load of the company at the higher hierarchy level in 
making decisions is larger. Consequently, the company at the lower rank in the 
hierarchy has a lower decisions load. 
 
 
It is observed that the same log-linear proportional relationship of structural 
control (betweenness centrality) over decisions load (stress centrality), with a 
slope equal to 1, applies to all the corporations. With the global model, three 
groups appear clearly (Figure 5.3). The three clear groups are: Group 1 – 
Boustead Holdings (the bottom regression line), Group 2 – Sime Darby, IOI 
Corporation, KL Kepong, Genting Plantations, and IJM Plantations (the middle 
regression lines) and Group 3 – Kulim and Jaya Tiasa (the top regression lines). 
Groups 2 and 3 consist of GLCs and family-owned companies.  
 
 
Referring to the horizontal and vertical lines in Figure 5.3, the firms have different 
decisions load at the same point of structural or hierarchical control. A horizontal 
line made at the structural control axis 6 indicates the same value for all firms. 
However, the vertical lines at the decisions load axis shows various values, 
ranging from 3.2 to 8.6 (Sicorp1~corp8). The variation in values reflects the decisions 
load at the same level for all companies. For example, Kulim and Jaya Tiasa 
have a decisions load that is relatively low, less than four at the same point of 
hierarchy level 6. Sime Darby, IOI Corp, KL Kepong, Genting Plantations, and 
IJM Plantations have a medium load (6 to 7) at the hierarchy level 6. Boustead 
shows the highest load, close to 9 at the hierarchy level 6. All corporations have 
different decision-making control capacity at the same level of hierarchical 
control and vice versa. A similar pattern appears when the same level of 
decisions’ load has different structural control ability across all firms. 
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Figure 5.3: Decision-making behaviour for major palm oil corporations 
using a global model 
 
 
All corporations’ regression lines intercepts the structural control axis at different 
values (Table 5.5) with given same value for slopes. It shows that given the same 
decisions load, all corporations show a different level of structural control and 
vice versa.  
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Table 5.6: Regression results for the corporations (global model) 
 Intercept SE Intercept Slope SE Slope df N SD Intercept SD Slope r2 
Boustead -14.570 0.013 1.000 0.000 536 544 0.295 0.000 
 
 
 
0.993 
 
Sime Darby -13.253 0.018 1.000 0.000 536 544 0.429 0.000 
IOI -13.009 0.054 1.000 0.000 536 544 1.255 0.000 
KLK -12.561 0.048 1.000 0.000 536 544 1.113 0.000 
Genting -12.403 0.025 1.000 0.000 536 544 0.583 0.000 
IJM -12.179 0.025 1.000 0.000 536 544 0.589 0.000 
Kulim -9.280 0.024 1.000 0.000 536 544 0.551 0.000 
Jaya Tiasa -9.405 0.022 1.000 0.000 536 544 0.505 0.000 
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There is a common behaviour for all corporations, which is the slope. This 
research do not delve in defining the slope. It will be defined in a future research. 
The analysis shows a single fundamental phenomenon which is the same for all 
corporations, and this phenomenon is the linear relationship between structural 
control and decisions load. Although there is one consistent phenomenon, there 
are also variations, which are shown by the different values of the intercepts. The 
intercepts serve as the ranking for each corporation, knowing that they are all 
governed by the same proportionality expressed by the slope. The intercepts 
differentiate for all corporations. The intercepts are identified as the structural 
flexibility. They have very different structural flexibilities, up to a factor of 3.0. The 
corporations can be differentiated and ranked by their level of structural flexibility. 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.5, the intercepts of a global model displayed differences 
across all corporations. When the decisions load is 0, the structural control in the 
corporation is at certain values. It means, when there is no decisions 
communicated in the structure, the control in the structure remained important at 
certain point. When there is no important control in the structure, the decisions 
load remained at certain point. This situation is seen as the structural flexibility 
because, the control of the structure and decisions load in the structure are not 
stagnant but varying according to their shareholdings structure pattern.      
 
 
A comparison of the intercepts shows the difference is significant. The fitness of 
this global model is 99.3%. It indicates that the model is very good for explaining 
the corporations’ decision-making behaviour. This model explains unifying 
findings by which all corporations are different at structural flexibility (intercepts), 
but have a common behaviour (slopes) which needs to be understood.  
 
 
Table 5.6 illustrates that the corporations are all significantly different by the 
intercepts. A global model is a better statistical model to explain the decision-
making behaviour by explaining the relationship between structural control 
(betweenness) and decisions load (stress). 
 
 
Among government-linked companies, Boustead Holdings has the lowest 
structural flexibility (14.57) compared to other federal government-linked 
companies like Sime Darby, IJM, and Kulim. IJM’s and Kulim’s businesses are 
not as diversified as Boustead and Sime Darby. This explains why IJM’s and 
Kulim’s structural flexibility are lower, making them more flexible in their 
operations. Among family-owned companies, IOI Corporation’s, KLK’s and 
Genting’s structural flexibility are not as low as Jaya Tiasa’s. The same 
justification applies, Jaya Tiasa is less diversified than IOI Corp, KLK and 
Genting. Based on the analysis, the nature of the ownership does not explain 
structural flexibility.  
 
 
Structural flexibility ranks the companies correspondingly to their size. Boustead 
as the biggest company within this research scope has the lowest structural 
flexibility, whereas Kulim and Jaya Tiasa are the smallest companies and have 
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the highest structural flexibility. This research validated the reslationship 
between structural fexibility and companies’ size parameters in the next section. 
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Table 5.7: Intercepts (flexibility) comparison for eight agribusiness corporations (global model) 
In
te
rc
e
p
t 
(p
 v
a
lu
e
) 
 
Intercept (p value) 
GLC Family-owned 
Boustead 
Sime 
Darby 
IJM Kulim IOI Corp KLK Gen-ting 
Jaya 
Tiasa 
G
L
C
 
Boustead 1.000        
Sime Darby 0.000* 1.000       
IJM 0.000* 0.000* 1.000      
Kulim 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 1.000     
F
a
m
il
y
-o
w
n
e
d
 IOI Corp 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 1.000    
KLK 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 1.000   
Genting 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.004* 1.000  
Jaya Tiasa 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 1.000 
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Structural control depends more on the topology of the ownership structure than 
the type of ultimate ownership (government-owned or family-owned). This is 
aligned with Arrow (1964) who mentioned that a classic business model is 
overpowered with the coordination of decisions that have a great stress at the 
central control in large business organisations. For an organisation that has high 
hierarchical relations for power centralisation, control is exercised by orders from 
the top and executed in detail by those at the bottom. It is similar to a pyramidal 
structure which displays a top-down chain of control (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Ultimate owners are at the top. The pyramid structure allows the ultimate owner 
to retain control of many firms.  
 
 
An organisation that has lower hierarchical relation, shows power 
decentralisation. It is focussed on the allocation of responsibilities vertically and 
horizontally in the structure, where the span of control are given to those at the 
middle and bottom to execute needed tasks.  
 
 
Decentralisation is induced by dispersed ownership. It gives individual owners 
minimum chance to participate in decision-making since the benefits are shared 
by all owners in proportion to their holdings (Leech & Leahy, 1991).  
 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the average structural control and decisions load for the eight 
corporations. This figure is derived from the average score of the structural 
control and decisions load in Figure 5.3. Looking at the quadrants in Figure 5.4, 
six companies are in the first quadrant, signifying high structural control with low 
decisions load. Of the six, two are government-owned companies, while the 
other four make up all of the family-owned companies. Sime Darby is in the 
second quadrant with low structural control with low decisions load. Boustead is 
in the fourth quadrant, low structural control with relatively high decisions load. 
This suggests that both Sime Darby’s and Boustead’s current corporate structure 
are at a disadvantage compared to the other companies. The disadvantage 
could be in terms of the size of the group – too big to be highly competitive. 
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Figure 5.4: Average hierarchical decisions load of major oil palm 
plantations corporations 
 
 
Among the GLCs, Kulim is the smallest in terms of size of corporate ownership 
topology. It contributes to the ability in having higher control (due to less 
hierarchical structure) and a low load of decisions. That is the key feature of the 
first quadrant. IJM Plantations has a bigger corporate ownership topology than 
Kulim but smaller than Sime Darby and Boustead. Sime Darby and Boustead 
have the lowest control because of their size of corporate ownership topology is 
the biggest among all companies. They are directly linked to the federal 
government investment entities, PNB and LTAT. This leads to high social 
responsibility than the other companies.  
 
 
Although all of the family-owned companies are in the first quadrant, their 
average hierarchical decisions load are scattered. It shows they vary in the level 
of structural control and decisions load. Jaya Tiasa has the highest structural 
control due to its smaller and leaner corporate ownership topology.  
 
 
5.2.3 Model Validation 
 
 
To confirm the findings of the intercepts outlined in the network topology 
structure, a further regression analysis is performed. This analysis is to study the 
relationship between structural flexibility (intercepts) and their network topology 
structure. The relationship between structural flexibility is well explained (r2 
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ranging from 0.67 to 0.84) with three network topology metrics, such as the 
number of nodes (companies), hierarchy index (%), and subsidiaries degree.  
 
 
The structural flexibility shows a relationship with the number of companies in 
the corporations (Figure 5.5). The structural flexibility is higher when there is a 
lesser number of companies in the corporation. It shows that the bigger the 
number of companies in the group, the less flexible it becomes. The lesser 
flexibility could be the result from the weight of information flow which is heavier 
and longer in terms of the chain-of-transferring the information. The pattern of a 
corporation’s tabulation in Figure 5.5 as very similar to the pattern shown in 
Figure 5.3. The model is 84% accurate in representing the relationship between 
structural flexibility and the number of companies.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Regression analysis between structural flexibility and number 
of companies in the corporations 
 
 
The relationship between structural flexibility and the hierarchy index is well-
explained (83.7%). The structural flexibility is higher when the hierarchy index is 
lower (Figure 5.6). When the structure is less hierarchical, the flow of information 
is faster, and if changes were to be implemented, it can be easily executed as 
there is less hierarchy level to deal with. The tabulation of the corporations is 
similar to the grouping of corporations in the linear regression graphs shown 
previously. 
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Figure 5.6: Regression analysis between structural flexibility and 
hierarchy index 
 
 
The relationship between structural flexibility and level of the ownership pyramid 
shows a high relationship (78%) (Figure 5.7). The same reason can be derived 
as in the hierarchy level. When the structure is less pyramidal, the spread of the 
information is not vast, and relatively easier to manage and control. The 
tabulation of the corporations has a wider range than the tabulation of previous 
figures. The structural flexibility becomes less as the tiers in the company’s 
pyramid increases. 
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Figure 5.7: Regression analysis between structural flexibility and pyramid 
levels 
 
 
These figures confirm that the emerging findings found in the study is very much 
related to flexibility. The flexibility is well explained with the size of the corporate 
ownership topology, such as the number of companies in the group, and the 
hierarchical structure of the group. The study has managed to quantify and 
qualify the structural control, decisions load, and flexibility based on the 
companies’ shareholdings data.  
 
 
All of the analysis regarding structural flexibility presented above do not 
discriminate the companies based on their ownership identity, but more to their 
ownership structure.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research analyses the links between ownership structures and decision-
making behaviour vested in GLCs and FOBs using network analysis. It provides 
answers to how complex shareholding structures shape decision-making among 
GLCs and FOBs in the agribusiness and plantations sector. The convoluted 
shareholding patterns in GLCs and FOBs were analysed to uncover how these 
patterns influence their decision-making behaviour. They are faced with the 
challenge of balancing financial growth with environmental sustainability. 
Besides, the global agriculture sector is in the process of financialisation, which 
increase the role of financial institutions as shareholders. Financialisation 
increases the complexity of the ownership structure of these firms, including 
those owned by the government, families or private individuals. 
 
 
This research concludes by relating the objectives of the study, the research 
questions with the findings obtained. The objectives and the questions were 
related to the main problem highlighted. By answering to the objectives and 
research questions, it is clear that this research was done systematically. 
 
 
6.1 Analysing The Shareholding Structure In Shaping Decision-Making 
Behaviour 
 
 
Research question: How to best describe the ownership structure of the 
corporations and link to decision-control behaviour? 
 
Network analysis metrics were found to best describe the ownership structure of 
the corporations. It could be linked to decision-control behaviour. They are the 
attributes that can help one understand where the control of decision-making 
lies. These metrics are ownership pyramid level, ownership tier, subsidiaries 
degree, shareholdings degree, hierarchical index, structural control and 
decisions load. This research finds that shareholding structures inform the 
control of the decision-making process in GLCs and FOBs in agribusiness and 
plantations companies. 
 
 
Ownership pyramid level, ownership tier, subsidiaries degree, shareholdings 
degree and hierarchical index were able to help to describe GLCs’ and FOBs’ 
decision-making patterns regardless of their ownership identity.  
 
 
Ownership pyramid level matters because it influences decision-making control. 
A higher number of pyramid levels indicates a longer chain of information in the 
decision-making process which leads to inefficiency and less flexibility/resilience. 
Subsidiaries degree displays the number of subsidiaries owned by the main 
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holding company. The more subsidiaries the company has, the wider the 
decision-making control in the structure. Shareholdings degree shows the 
number of shareholders in the main holding company. The more major 
shareholders the company has, the more likely the decision-making is potentially 
heterogeneous. The hierarchical index indicates the level of hierarchy in the 
business group structure. The higher the hierarchical index, the longer the 
decision-making flow is, and there is less potential autonomy existing among 
subsidiaries. Hierarchical layouts for the ownership structure network visuals 
served as the X-ray images of the corporations.  
 
 
Betweenness and stress are the main attributes that quantify the structural 
control and the decisions load explains the decision-making control behaviour. It 
is clear that the higher the structural control in the corporation, the heavier the 
decisions load in the structure. When the size of the company increases, so does 
its decisions load because the number of hierarchy levels increases. 
 
 
6.2 Analysing the Glcs and Fobs Decision-Making Control Patterns 
 
 
Research question: Are the GLCs and FOBs ownership structures similar or 
different? 
 
The ownership structures of eight plantation companies under this study shared 
some similarities and differences. In all the eight cases, the relationship between 
the distribution of decision load and the structural control is linear. It means that 
the higher the hierarchy, the bigger the decisions load are. This phenomenon is 
not correlated with the ownership identity of the GLC and FOB. It means the size 
of the corporation’s hierarchy does not defined by the type of ownership. Further 
works can be done in searching for what could define the hierarchy size of the 
corporation. For example, Boustead and IOI Corporations have more common 
features in their ownership topology structure. Sime Darby and KL Kepong 
showed that they are apart from others. Both cases showed that the ownership 
type is dissassociated with the topology of the corporate stuctures. 
The analysis shows that some company structures are common while some are 
apart. The commonalities signified that the GLCs’ and FOBs’ structure patterns 
do not follow the ownership type.  
 
 
6.3 Ownership Structure Criteria To Explain Decision-Control 
Behaviour: A Mathematical Relationship Representation Of Glcs And 
Fobs Decision-Making Behaviour 
 
 
Research questions:  
 
1) Is there a general criteria to link to the decision-making control 
behaviour? 
2) Can decision-control behaviour be represented by a mathematical 
relationship? 
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Based on the findings, the general criteria to link the decision-making control 
behaviour is the flexibility that emerged as the property from structural control 
(betweenness) against the decisions load (stress). Flexibility appeared based on 
the intercepts of the linear relationship of the network metrics. It linked the two 
decision-making control behaviour (structural control and decisions load). It 
could also be employed to rank the corporations, to get the initial interpretation 
of the behaviour. 
 
 
The analysis shows that all companies have various flexibility levels. The higher 
rankings are found in Kulim, a GLC and Jaya Tiasa, a FOB, which have the 
highest flexibility levels, and show a lighter decisions load and structural control 
in their structure. The lowest ranking is in Boustead, a GLC, which has the 
heaviest decisions load and structural control in its corporate structure. The other 
five companies, consisting of two GLCs and three FOBs are in the middle 
rankings where their decisions load and structural control are at moderate–high 
level. It should be noted however that while all corporations have a similar linear 
pattern of decision-making control, their levels of structural flexibility differ. It 
means that, although the structural control and decisions load accelerate at a 
similar pattern, the flexibility occurred varies following the size of the companies. 
 
 
This research has successfully identified a simple mathematical model for the 
relationship between structural control and the decision load of GLCs and FOBs 
in the agribusiness and plantation sector. The model proves that all companies, 
whether GLCs or FOBs, follow a fundamental structural law where the structural 
control and the decisions load of the company increase linearly together.  
 
 
Based on the linear relationship between structural control and the decision load, 
structural flexibility/resilience can be measured with the intercepts. It indicates 
that the companies’ decision-making behaviour is similar regardless of their 
ownership identity. All companies display a linear pattern of acceleration in 
structural control and their decisions load, when the structural control increases, 
the decisions load increases accordingly. This acceleration pattern does not 
differentiate the ownership type of the companies, but makes a distinction based 
on the companies’ size. The larger the company, the higher its structural control 
and decisions load. The variation in size occurs in both GLCs and FOBs. 
 
 
These differences are correlated with some of the ownership structure attributes 
identified earlier, such as the number of companies in the business group, the 
hierarchical index and the pyramidal levels. It can be concluded here that the 
level of companies’ flexibility in the decision-making control is very much 
dependent on the design of ownership structure, rather than their status as either 
GLCs or FOBs. 
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6.4 Significant Findings 
 
 
There are a few significant findings discovered in this research. Firstly, the 
mathematical model for the relationship between company’s ownership structure 
and decision-making behaviour. The model was applied to all companies studied 
in this research which are a part of Malaysia’s agribusiness and plantation sector. 
This model can be applied to understand decision-making behaviour of 
companies in other sectors. The production of a mathematical model shows that 
this research can be replicated as well as improved.  
 
 
The findings of this research can be beneficial for companies because they can 
use the model to analyse their decision-making process and determine their level 
of flexibility and resilience. The model can also be employed to identify current 
and future potential weaknesses in a company’s structure and decision-making 
behaviour. It opens a further research path to extend the scope of the study, and 
further explore the limitations identified in this research. 
 
 
Secondly, this research finds that there is no significant difference in GLCs and 
FOBs decision-making behaviour. All companies followed the linear pattern of 
increase in structural control and decisions load, at their own pace. The 
tabulation of the companies did not differentiate their ownership identity, but their 
size. This finding is significant to the discussion of privatisation of government-
owned companies. In this case, privatisation may not improve the decision-
making control of the company.  Besides, this finding is relevant for carrying out 
merger and acquisition process of a company, where it shows that the size of a 
company reflects the flexibility and the decision-making control.  
 
 
Thirdly, this research discovers that the corporate structure defines the corporate 
decision-making behaviour. The chain-of-control in a company’s decision-
making resides in the corporate structure. In understanding the complexities in 
the corporate structure, it is important to apply a tool that can decipher the 
complexities and be able to discover the important features in the structure which 
relate to the decision-making control. This finding is significant because it 
discovers a new perspective in understanding the complexity of the corporate 
structure and corporate decision-making behaviour using a quantitative tool. 
 
 
6.5 Implications of The Findings 
 
 
The implications of the findings to the government, investors, and company 
performance are evident in some ways. The government has dual role in the 
plantation sector, the owner, via the shareholdings of the plantation corporations 
through the GLICs, and the regulatory body of the sector. The findings did not 
delve into the regulatory aspect of the government. It is evident that the 
corporations’ ownership structure could draw some meanings to the governance 
of the corporations. It shows little regulations on the topology of the ownership 
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structure, especially in terms of size of the corporations, and the concentration 
of shares.  
 
 
As for the investors, the findings could be employed as one of the tool to assess 
the flexibility or the decision control behaviour of any business sector. Even 
though it will not be complete and comprehensive, but it could provide the 
baseline knowledge of economic sector behaviour in terms of their ownership 
structure. 
 
 
Based on the research findings, the ownership structure plays important role 
towards company performance. This can be seen through the flexibility index 
emerged from the results, where it indicates the strengths and weaknesses of 
each of the corporation’s structure. We assumed, the strengths could boost the 
performance, for example, if the corporation has a high flexibility in their decision-
making behaviour, they could adapt to the market changes at ease compared to 
the least flexible decision-making behaviour. 
 
 
6.6 Research Limitations 
 
 
While this research has generated revolutionary findings in the field of agriculture 
business and management, it has some limitations. The first is the selection of 
the agribusiness companies. There are about 50 public-listed agribusiness 
companies in Malaysia, but this research selects only eight major companies. 
The research needs ten levels shareholdings data to accomplish holistic results, 
which makes studying all 50 companies unfeasible. Besides, the remaining 42 
companies are medium and small plantations with market capitalisation value 
less than RM1 billion. The research operates on the assumption that these major 
eight companies can represent all agribusiness companies in Malaysia. 
 
 
Secondly, this research is multidisciplinary. It involves different fields of studies 
such as business, economy and management studies, political business, and 
complex network studies. The scope of the research is relatively new. Experts 
who deal with all three disciplines are limited. Therefore, there is room for 
expansion in this scope of the research. 
 
 
6.7 Recommendations 
 
 
Based on the results, several research projects can emerge from this research. 
First, as the research does not define the slope of the linear relationship of 
structural control and decisions load, future studies can take up the task to 
explore further the meaning of the slope. This can provide a greater depth of 
understanding of the current findings and analysis. 
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Secondly, while the thesis has been written in 2017, the data for this research 
was based on the 2013 company reports. This research can be further 
developed by using a more recent set of data.   
 
 
Thirdly, the research do not measure the controlling power of the corporations. 
There are a few methods to calculate and analyse this power based on network 
centralities, such as Eigenvector and Bonacich. It will be valuable to identify and 
analyse the controlling power among the corporations within a sector, or a 
country, to better understand corporate networks.  
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